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Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are computer-based
process control systems that interconnect and monitor remote physical processes. There
have been many real world documented incidents and cyber-attacks affecting SCADA
systems, which clearly illustrate critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. These reported
incidents demonstrate that cyber-attacks against SCADA systems might produce a variety
of financial damage and harmful events to humans and their environment. This
dissertation documents four contributions towards increased security for SCADA systems.
First, a set of cyber-attacks was developed. Second, each attack was executed against two
fully functional SCADA systems in a laboratory environment; a gas pipeline and a water
storage tank. Third, signature based intrusion detection system rules were developed and
tested which can be used to generate alerts when the aforementioned attacks are executed
against a SCADA system. Fourth, a set of features was developed for a decision tree
based anomaly based intrusion detection system. The features were tested using the
datasets developed for this work.

This dissertation documents cyber-attacks on both serial based and Ethernet based
SCADA networks. Four categories of attacks against SCADA systems are discussed:
reconnaissance, malicious response injection, malicious command injection and denial of
service. In order to evaluate performance of data mining and machine learning algorithms
for intrusion detection systems in SCADA systems, a network dataset to be used for
benchmarking intrusion detection systemswas generated. This network dataset includes
different classes of attacks that simulate different attack scenarios on process control
systems. This dissertation describes four SCADA network intrusion detection datasets; a
full and abbreviated dataset for both the gas pipeline and water storage tank systems.
Each feature in the dataset is captured from network flow records. This dataset groups
two different categories of features that can be used as input to an intrusion detection
system. First, network traffic features describe the communication patterns in a SCADA
system. This research developed both signature based IDS and anomaly based IDS for the
gas pipeline and water storage tank serial based SCADA systems. The performance of
both types of IDS were evaluates by measuring detection rate and the prevalence of false
positives.

Keywords: Intrusion detection system, SCADA, Vulnerability, Dataset, Network
Security
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Background
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are computer-based
process control systems that interconnect and monitor remote physical processes.
SCADA systems collect data from remotes facilities about the state of the physical
process and send commands to control the physical process creating a feedback control
loop. SCADA systems are widely used in chemical processing, petroleum refining,
electrical power generation and distribution, water purification and distribution,
intelligent buildings and nuclear plants.
Contemporary SCADA systems are distributed cyber-physical systems. These
systems consist of Remote Terminal Units (RTU), Master Terminal Units (MTU),
Human Machine Interface software (HMI) and the sensors and actuators that interface
with the physical system. Remote terminal units are connected to sensors and actuators to
interface directly with a physical process. RTU commonly store control parameters and
execute programs that directly control the physical process. For instance, an RTU may be
used to control the water level in a tank. It will be programmed with a high water level a
low water level. The RTU continuously monitors the water level with a connected water
level sensor. If the water reaches the programmed high level, the RTU turns off a pump
that fills the tank. If the water level reaches the low level, the RTU turns on the pump to
1

add water to the system. The RTU, the ladder logic (or other programmation), and the
attached sensors and actuators form a feedback control loop.
Master Terminal Units (MTU) are connected to the RTU via SCADA network
communication links. The MTU polls the RTU periodically to read physical quantities of
the controlled system such as a voltage, pressure, and water level. Typically this
information is displayed on a Human Machine Interface (HMI) to allow operators to
monitor the physical process. HMI typically allow the operator to monitor the physical
process. HMI typically also allow the operator to interact with the physical process.
Operators may change operating parameters. For example an operator may change the
high and low water levels set points, from the previously mentioned water system
example. The MTU, RTU, communication link, HMI, and operator form a second
supervisory feedback control loop. The communication links in a SCADA network can
be thought of as occupying layers 1, 2 and 7 of the OSI model; these are physical, data
link (and media access control), and application layers respectively. The physical layer
may be wired or wireless. Wired networks may use leased lines, category 5 or 6 cables,
serial cable, and/or fiber optic cable. Wireless links may also use proprietary nonstandard protocols. Finally, wireless links may include very long distance solutions such
as satellite and microware links. SCADA communication network protocols include
Fieldbus, Profibus, MODBUS, DeviceNet, Distributed Network Protocol version 3
(DNP3), EtherNet/IP and ControlNet. All of these protocols have versions that have been
adapted to use TCP/IP as network and transport layers for use with commodity Internet
equipment.

2

Fig 1 [i]illustrates a typical SCADA architecture. The Field devices consist of
RTUs, the Programmable Logic Devices (PLCs) and the Intelligent Electronic Devices
(IEDs). Field devices are connected to the SCADA network and the SCADA network are
connected with the corporate intranets.

Figure 1

SCADA network architecture

SCADA systems have a strategic importance due to the fact that they are adopted
by the Critical Infrastructure (CI) of nation. The President’s Commission on Critical
Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) defined CI as “whose incapacity or destruction would
have a debilitating impact on our defense and economic security” [ii]. CI is associated
with energy, transport and utilities. Any damage to CI may impact on the economy of a
country.
3

There have been several real-world documented incidents and cyber-attacks
affecting SCADA systems, which clearly illustrate critical infrastructure vulnerabilities.
These reported incidents demonstrate that cyber-attacks on SCADA systems might
produce a variety of financial damage and harmful events to humans and their
environment.
Team Cymru, a specialized Internet security research firm, released a briefing
paper in 2008 [iii] which discussed malicious port scan activity against their DarkNet (a
honey pot) searching for open ports on port numbers commonly associated with SCADA
system network protocols. This report showed heavy scanning activity from four areas:
Asia, North America, Western Europe and Eastern Europe. The report cited heavy
scanning of DNP3 ports from Russia and Taiwan and heavy scanning activities for
MODBUS related ports in Western Europe and China. This port scanning is potentially
indicative of attackers searching for SCADA systems for later attacks.
Stuxnet [iv] is the first known worm to target an industrial control system. Stuxnet
targeted PC’s running the Siemens WinCC SCADA software product. Infected systems
had a DLL replaced used by the WinCC Step7 tool. The worm then monitored
communications between the WinCC tool and a remote terminal. If a specific signature
related to the remote terminal was found firmware on the remote terminal was replaced
with malicious code. The malicious code on the remote terminal caused the physical
process to misoperate while continuing to inform operators that the system was
functioning correctly.
On January 2000, an ex-employee of a contracting company attacked the
Maroochy Shire Council’s sewage control system in Queensland, Australia. A pump in
4

the control system failed to start or stop when specified and an alarm failed to alert. This
attack made approximately 264, 000 gallons of raw sewage leak to nearby rivers [v].
In 2003, the Davis-Besse nuclear plant in Oak Harbor Ohio was attacked by the
Slammer Worm which made a safety monitoring system of the plant offline for
approximately five hours [vi].
The following sections provide motivation information on intrusion detection and
vulnerabilities analysis of SCADA system, and list the contributions of this research.
Motivation
National Electric Reliability Council (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection
(CIP) Standards 002-3 through 009-3 [vii] require utilities and other responsible entities to
place critical cyber assets within an electronic security perimeter. The electronic security
perimeters must be subjected to vulnerability analyses, use access control technologies,
and include systems to monitor and log the electronic security perimeter access. The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) requires responsible entities involved in
bulk electricity transmission to adhere to the NERC CIP 002-3 through 009-3 standards.
No such regulation exits for the electric distribution systems and other critical
infrastructure, such as water treatment and distribution and gas distribution in the United
States. Electronic perimeter security will minimize the threat of illicit network
penetrations, however, persons with electronic access to SCADA systems within the
electronic security perimeter still remain a threat.
There are many security mechanisms that can secure process control systems such
as access control via passwords and firewalls, data diodes, virus scanning, encryption,
and digital signatures. These solutions are required for defense in depth for SCADA
5

systems. However, none of them are completely secure. Attacks continue to defeat
security mechanisms to penetrate systems and execute attacks against confidentiality,
integrity and availability. Because current security mechanisms can never be 100%
secure, intrusion detection systems are needed to monitor attacks in progress.
The original goals of SCADA network protocols were to provide reliable
communication to transmit system information and control commands between MTU and
RTU. Furthermore, RTU, programmable logic controllers (PLC), programmable
automation controllers (PAC), and intelligent electronic devices (IED) have limited
computing capability and network bandwidth which limits their ability to provide
comprehensive cyber security features. Many widely used protocols in SCADA systems
also lack security features [viii]. For instance, MODBUS[ix], DNP3[x] and Allen Bradley’s
Ethernet Industrial Protocol xilack of authentication capability leads to the potential for
network penetrators and disgruntled insiders to inject false command and false response
network packets into a SCADA system either through direct creation of such packets or
replay attacks. Due to the fact that the core of the control flow of every SCADA system is
the communication protocols [xii], one possible solution to improve security is to extend
the protocol to add authentication. There is a secure version of the MODBUS protocol
[xiii] which can add integrity, authentication, no-repudiation and anti-replay mechanisms.
In order to secure the DNP3 protocol based SCADA system, Flexi-DNP3 [xiv] (Flexible
Distributed Network Protocol Version 3) is designed by using DNPSec [xv].
Patching each RTU in order to use modified protocols is difficult. In a large scale
SCADA system, there are maybe thousands of remote devices such as PLC and IED.
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These devices may be in remote locations. As such it will be very difficult to patch every
device. Further a single network may include devices from multiple vendors.
One common important feature of SCADA systems is 24/7 operation. Upgrading
communication protocols usually means downtime of the SCADA system, which should
be considered before implementation of a modified protocol.
Similarly with IT security area, the new threats to SCADA system increase day
after day. Even if a modified secure protocol can prevent already known attacks to
process control system, it cannot ensure to stop new attack. The SCADA system still may
require continual patching.
The interconnection of SCADA networks with corporate networks and with the
Internet increases efficiency and productivity of the process control system. Operators or
companies may collect real time system information by using corporate networks and
take control of the devices remotely. However, this integration leads to more security
issues [xvi]. It may open up the SCADA network to corporate network vulnerabilities.
Attackers may gain access to the SCADA network from the corporate network. Possible
attack processes are described as follow. Attackers may exploit existing vulnerabilities of
the operating system of computers or servers in corporate network. From these computers
or servers, attackers may gain user name and password credentials to gain access to the
SCADA system. Malware may be installed through a web browser or email client on a
computer, server, printer, and later gain access to the SCADA network to take control of
remote devices. Malicious insiders who have full access authorization may access the
SCADA system to change the configuration of the SCADA network or of individual
SCADA system components.
7

Since the integration of a SCADA network and a corporate network may
introduce more threats to SCADA systems, one solution to enhance security is to add
firewalls, using access control lists and implement cryptographic protection to enhance
system security. Firewalls are required between SCADA networks and corporate
networks to block illegal access and malicious behavior targeting the SCADA network.
Access Control Lists (ACL) will block unauthorized user who try to access remote
devices in process control systems. However, ACLs also have some issues [xvii]: attackers
may bypass access control in the gateway. Second, if the SCADA network has thousands
of remote devices, the access control list will be very large which may lead to long delay
which may be unacceptable for hard real time SCADA systems. Finally, malware may
infect machines with allowed by ACL to communicate with SCADA system devices.
Applying cryptography [xviii][xix] is another alternative solution to improve
SCADA system security. Communication time delay is an issue when implementing
cryptographic methods for SCADA systems control systems [xx]. SCADA control
systems have real time requirements. Cryptography should not add delay which causes
real time requirements to not be met. Cryptography requires secure key distribution to be
effective. Many papers, including [xxi][xxii][xxiii], have proposed key management systems
for SCADA systems. Unfortunately, none of these solutions have led to actual
deployments. Wright et al. [xxiv] present an encryption protocol for a SCADA system
based on cyclic redundancy codes (CRC), however, there have been no progress updates
on this research since 2006. Additionally, other researchers have criticized this
encryption as unable to provide adequate protection against attacks. Kang and Kim [xxv]
applied a symmetric encryption algorithm and added a device on the MTU side and RTU
8

side of the network to encrypt and decrypt network packets. Experimental results show
the time delay from this method does not affect the communication. However, it may be
difficult to implement this encryption methodology for SCADA systems with large
numbers of remote devices due to key distribution issues and the cost of deployment.
The idea of intrusion detection is a well-established approach in the traditional IT
security area. A SCADA network is different from conventional IT networks several
ways [xxvi] [xxvii]. First, SCADA networks are real time systems. Second, network
availability is critically important to allow operators to continually monitor and control
SCADA systems. Third, computer capability and memory resources in SCADA devices
is limited which means it is difficult for existing devices to be upgraded to add security
enhancements. In order to monitor network traffic and detect malicious behaviors in
SCADA systems a SCADA-specific Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is required.
The KDD Cup 1999 dataset [xc] (here after “KDD dataset”) provides labeled
dataset for intrusion detection researchers in the information technology (IT) area. The
KDD dataset includes approximately 5 million connection records which are divided into
four categories of attacks: probing attacks, denial of service (DOS) attacks, User to
Remote (U2R) attacks, Remote to Local (R2L) attacks, and normal connection records.
Each connection record includes 41 network related attributes. Probing attacks are
information gathering attacks which map the network to gather information, like which
services are available, which ports are open or what type of operating system runs in the
target host. DOS attacks lead hosts to run out of computing capability or memory
resources so that legitimate requests for service are refused. U2R attacks aim to provide
an attacker with root or administrator privileges. R2L attacks aim to gain local access to
9

local machines from remote machines. Table 1 lists categories of attacks and attack
names found in the KDD dataset.
Table 1

KDD99 Dataset Attacks by Category
NAME OF SYSTEM
CATEGORIES OF
ATTACKS

Probing

Denial of Service (DoS)
User to Root

ATTACK NAME

ipsweep, nmap, portsweep, satan
back, land, neptune, pod, smurf,teardrop
buffer_overflow, loadmodule, perl,

(U2R)

phf,rootkit

Remote to Local (R2L)

ftp_write, guess_passwd, imap

Many researchers in the SCADA security area use datasets developed in house to
test intrusion detection systems. There is no uniform dataset which includes normal
network traffic and attacks against a SCADA network which can be used by researchers
as a benchmark to compare the IDS performance. In order to evaluate performance of
data mining and machine learning algorithms for intrusion detection systems in SCADA
systems, a network dataset used for benchmarking intrusion detection systems should be
generated. This network dataset should include different classes of attacks which simulate
different attack scenarios on process control system networks
Research Contribution
This dissertation includes four major contributions. First, a set of cyber-attacks
against a gas pipeline, water storage tank, and chemical processing systems are described.
Attacks are grouped into 4 categories: reconnaissance, malicious command injection,
malicious response injection, and denial of service. Second, a dataset was created which
10

includes network traffic captured from gas pipeline and water storage tank networks
during normal operation and during periods of attack. The datasets can be used to
benchmark SCADA intrusion detection systems. Third, a set of signature based intrusion
detection rules were developed to detect the aforementioned attacks against the gas
pipeline and water storage tank systems. Fourth, a set of input features were developed
for use with a decision tree anomaly based intrusion detection system. The new input
features were leverage physical system state information found in SCADA network
packets to predict future control actions and process measurements. Both the signature
based and anomaly based intrusion detection systems were evaluated. Evaluation
included calculation of accuracy using detection rate and false positive rates. Both
instruction detection systems were found to have high accuracy and low false positive
rates. Analysis of intrusion detection system accuracy is provided for each class of attack.
Flow records in SCADA network communication not only describe network
traffic patterns such as remote device addresses, function codes etc, but the payload of the
packets also provides much more information to describe the control flow or state of the
control system.
This research develops SCADA network intrusion detection datasets and extracts
features from network flow records. This dataset groups two different categories of
features that can be used for input to the intrusion detection system. First, network traffic
features describe the communication pattern in a SCADA system. Compared with
enterprise IT network, process control system topologies are static and the services
provided by the system are regular. Some attacks against control systems may change the
communication pattern in network, so network traffic features can be used to describe
11

normal traffic patterns and detect malicious activity. Another category of features are
payload features for process control systems including system measurements such as air
pressure, water level and the system setting point.
The signature based intrusion detection approaches monitor the traffic record and
match the traffic pattern to known misuse patterns or rule to detect rules violations. Snort
[xxviii]is an open source signature based network intrusion detection system. This research
applies Snort IDS with signature rules combined with system state prediction rules to
detect malicious behaviors in SCADA networks.
Anomaly IDS uses statistical models or machine learning algorithms to classify
network traffic as normal or abnormal (or into smaller sub-classes). Various model types
or classifiers can be used to build the anomaly IDS. This research applies Bayesian
network, neural network and decision tree to classify network transactions as normal or
abnormal. Decision tree algorithm is selected due to the fact that it is one of most useful
techniques in deterministic classification. Bayesian network is a fundamental statistical
approach to the problem of pattern classification. Neural network is also a widely
classification algorithm in intrusion detection system. So these three classification
algorithms are selected in this research.
It is hypothesized that building a SCADA system intrusion detection dataset to
evaluate SCADA IDS performance is possible through the SCADA system threat model
analysis and different exploiting methods both serial based and Ethernet based SCADA
network. Most SCADA systems are designed for using a long period, the topology of
SCADA network is static and the network communication traffic pattern is regular.
Therefore intrusion detection system can use anomaly traffic pattern to detect abnormal
12

communication traffic. Furthermore, process control systems are based on the feedback
control loop, the system measurements are inputs to the controller such as PID controller.
Based on the system current measurements, system setting parameters and controller
parameters, the next measurements can be predicted.
Organization
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II provides a
literature review. The literature review is broken into a threat analysis of SCADA
networks, literature on attacks against SCADA systems, signature based intrusion
detection systems, anomaly based intrusion detection systems, and SCADA specific
intrusion detection systems. Chapter III discusses a set of cyber-attacks which target two
serial based SCADA systems; the gas pipeline system and the water storage tank system.
Attacks against an Ethernet based chemical processing system are also described. Attacks
are grouped into four categories; reconnaissance, malicious response injection, malicious
command injection, and denial of service. Chapter IV describes four data sets created
from capturing network traffic from the gas pipeline and water storage tank systems
during normal operation and when the attacks from Chapter III were executed against
these systems. There are four datasets total. The first datasets contain the complete set of
traffic. The second pair is a scaled down set to enable faster processing when evaluating
intrusion detection systems. Chapter V discusses implementation of signature based and
anomaly based intrusion detection. Chapter VI make the conclusion of this dissertation.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Threats Analysis of SCADA Networks
Many works were found which describe threats to SCADA systems and networks.
SCADA systems are exposed to serious vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers.
Research on cyber threats and vulnerabilities show the security challenges and the secure
approaches in SCADA networks. In the [xxix][xxx][xxxi], the authors analyze potential cyber
threats to SCADA systems and explain the technological challenges for SCADA systems.
These papers highlight that SCADA control systems connected to the internet are subject
to reconnaissance, fabrication, and Denial of Service attacks from the internet The
SCADA network architecture based on the open standard communication protocols
renders the system more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Valentine et al. explain software
vulnerabilities in the ladder logic for the PLC and shows that current programming
practices do not protect against logic errors and malicious code level attacks on SCADA
systems [xxxii]. Edward Chikuni and Maxwell Dondo [xxxiii] investigate the security
challenges in electrical power systems. This paper analyzes the SCADA computing
vulnerabilities which include hardware (RTU, IED, master, etc) vulnerabilities and
software vulnerabilities. Dong Wei et al. [xvii] demonstrate potential cyber-attacks and
their impacts on the power grid and classify these attacks into three categories, attacks on
automation devices, attacks on protocols, and attacks on topologies. Attacks on
14

automation devices occur when attackers take advantage of the vulnerabilities of the
devices such as PLCs, IEDs to launch attack against the SCADA system. Attacks on
protocols occur when attackers use the vulnerabilities of the SCADA network protocols
to attack the SCADA system. Attacks on topologies occur when attacks take advantage of
the vulnerabilities of topology design of the SCADA system to attack. In the [xxxiv], the
authors describe the difference of security issue between general IT network and
industrial process network, and the application of security concepts and tools. In the IT
community, the primary security issues usually include confidentiality and integrity,
while in control systems, the primary security issues usually include data integrity and
availability. Gardner et al. [xxxv] discusses an RTU failure vulnerability for power
infrastructure. In [xxxvi], McDaniel et al. present security and privacy issues for the
smart grid. McDaniel et a primarily discuss data integrity issues for software and smart
meters in the smart grid Byres [xxxvii] lists attack goals, technical difficulty, severity of
impact, probability of detection for the critical infrastructures. Byres concluded that the
detection probability of compromising MTU writing data to RTU and compromising
RTU writing data to MTU is low.
In order to analyze the vulnerabilities and cyber threats of SCADA systems, many
researchers focus on building a SCADA testbed or simulation. A simulation tool for
building the SCADA system which can test the effect of attacks on real devices and
applications is proposed in [xxxviii]. The presented simulation tool supports
intergradations of external devices into the simulation system. The attacks presented in
this work only include DOS attack and spoofing. In [xxxix], Wang et al. provide a
SCADA simulation environment that can model vulnerability exploitations. This
15

environment can provide Modbus, Profibus, network traffic. However, this simulation
environment does not include any simulated plants or control systems. Fovino et al. [xii],
present details of a physical power plant emulator and demonstrates attack scenarios that
can drive the simulated system into critical state. In [xl], Queiroz et al. propose an
architecture of a modular SCADA testbed based on MODBUS protocol and describe a
distributed Denial of Service attack on that testbed. Mallouhi et al. [xli] propose a
SCADA security evaluation testbed and preliminary attacks against it. The SCADA
testbed can provide simulated environment to SCADA security researcher. an alternative
to simulating SCADA control systems is to provide network data logs of captured during
execution of attacks against SCADA control systems and capture while a system is
behaving normally. Such datasets are less expensive and can therefore be made available
to many researchers. A contribution of this dissertation is a set of datasets for SCADA
security researchers.
Attack on SCADA Systems
In [xlii] [xliii], the authors investigate the vulnerabilities of a SCADA system
which monitors and controls the Gignac irrigation canal system located in South France.
These two papers present a linearized shallow water partial differential equation (PDE)
system that can model water flow in the Gignac canal network which uses lateral offtakes
for water withdrawal. The authors develop a stealth deception attack based on the
knowledge of switching the PDE parameters and proportional (P) boundary control
actions to steal water from the pool using the offtake. The authors tested the attack with
experiments in a simulation environment and in the Gignac irrigation canal system. These
attacks can enable attackers steal water from the canal.
16

Jie Yan et al [xliv] identifies vulnerabilities and develops cyber-attack scenarios
against a wind farm SCADA system. These scenarios include sending malicious
commands to the wind turbine, a Man-In-The-Middle attack to send false measurement
data to the wind farm operator, and internal attacks. These attacks may cause economic
loss and equipment damage problems in the power system.
Dillon Beresford [xlv] at the 2011 Blackhat conference introduced reconnaissance,
fingerprint, replay, authentication bypass, and remote attacks against a Siemens Simatic
S7 PLC. This paper analyzes the vulnerabilities of the S7 PLC and the PROFINET
protocol and introduces the MetaSploit Auxiliary S7 PLC scanner module.
Terry Fleury, Himanshu Khurana and Von Welch [xlvi] propose a taxonomy of
attacks against energy control systems. This paper presents an Attack Vulnerability
Damage (AVD) model which includes classes of cyber-attacks, energy control system
vulnerabilities, and the potential damages. The authors discuss several attacks such as
probe, flood, bypass, terminate, execute, modify and deletion attacks.
Mallouhi et al. [xlvii] presents SCADA cyber-attacks against a MODBUS TCP
protocol based testbed. This paper discusses two types of attack, MODBUS and TCP
attacks. The MODBUS attacks include a Denial of Service attack which issues illegal
commands from a compromised HMI and a Man-In-The-Middle attack. The TCP attacks
include a TCP SYN flood attack and a TCP ACK flooding attack.
In [xlviii], Sridharet al. discuss data integrity attacks and a Denial of Service
attack against a SCADA control system. The data integrity attacks include the Min attack
and the Max attack [xlix]. The goal of this type of data integrity attack is to misguide the
operator into making decisions based on malicious fake data. The DOS attack in this
17

research makes the sensing signal unavailable to the control room or makes the control
signal unavailable to the physical devices.
Le et al. [l] present a false data injection attack that can lead to financial loss
against the state estimation algorithm used in a deregulated electricity market. These
attacks affect the system by compromising numbers of sensors and sending false
measurements to Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) in order to makea profit
from the market. In [li], another group of false data injection attacks against the state
estimation algorithm in electric power grids are introduced. These false data injection
attacks can bypass current bad measurement detection or state estimation techniques. The
authors analyze two attack scenarios. The first scenario is called Limited Access to
Meters. In this case, the attacker can only access some specific meters. In this scenario,
random false data injection attacks and targeted false data injection attacks are developed.
Another scenario is called Limited Resources to Compromise Meters. In this scenario,
attackers have limited resources to compromise meters. Experimental results show that
the attacker can efficiently construct attack vectors in both scenarios, which can change
the state estimation result and modify the predicted state.
In [lii], Dong et al. introduce an event buffer overflow attack against the DNP3
protocol. There are two types of event buffers in the DNP3 protocol, the sequence of
events buffer and the most recent event buffer. The authors identify a vulnerability in the
sequence of events buffer due to the fact that it is fed by all slaves from whom a data
aggregator acquires data and uses a first-come-first-serve rule in buffer. Buffer flooding
attacks launched on a DNP3 network can lead to a high load flow that can occupy most
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of the bandwidth. In this situation, the sequence of events buffer will drop normal
packets.
Intrusion Detection System
There are two main types of detection techniques known as the signature based
detection and the anomaly based detection. Signature based IDS use an attack signature
database to determine whether the signature has been triggered. Signature based IDS are
effective for detecting known attacks and have small false positive rates. Anomaly based
IDS use mathematical techniques such as machine learning or data mining to check for
deviations from a predefined normal behavior model. Anomaly based detection may
detect previously unknown attacks, also known as zero day attacks. Anomaly based
IDS typically have lower detection accuracy than signature based IDS and a higher rate
of false positives.
Signature Based IDS
Signature based IDS focus on matching signatures stored in databases with
information in network packets. This approach is efficient when detecting known attacks.
Within the area of SCADA security, control system security researchers have developed
signature based IDS which monitor the MODBUS network transactions watching for
signatures of known attacks and vulnerabilities.
Quickdraw [liii] is an application to enhance the Snort IDS [liv] to create security
log events for a SCADA control system. The snort preprocessors allow the Snort
detection engine to check the packets using industrial control system protocols such as
Modbus, DNP3. However, the signature database depends on the security expert
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knowledge and experiences. Furthermore, signature based IDS cannot detect new attacks,
so they are often behind attackers. Many industrial control system devices are not
updated with patches on a regular basis and therefore may not include the latest security
patches. Therefore a signature based IDS is a valuable tool to detect older attacks which
may not be possible against a patched system.
Anomaly Based IDS
Anomaly based IDS use statistical models or machine learning algorithms to
classify network traffic as normal or abnormal (or into smaller sub-classes). Various
model types or classifiers can be used to build an anomaly based IDS, including neural
networks, linear methods, regression models, and Bayesian networks [lv].There are two
types of inaccuracies in IDS: false positives and false negatives. False positives [lvi] [lvii]
generate a false alarm when there is no intrusion, while false negatives miss an actual
intrusion. The accuracy of anomaly intrusion detection systems relies on training dataset
completeness, proper input feature development, and the choice of classifier.
Wang and Stolfo [lviii] present a payload based anomaly network intrusion
detection system called PAYL. PAYL models the normal application payload of network
traffic using an unsupervised method. A byte frequency distribution profile and the
standard deviation of the payload are used to train the IDS classifier. In the detection
stage, PAYL uses the Mahalanob is distance to compare the new record against the predefined profile. The Columbia University Computer Science (CUCS) department
network (CUCS) datasets were captured from a university network and include attack
traffic and normal traffic. The evaluation results show that PAYL can successfully detect
the attacks in CUCS dataset.
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Artificial neural networks (ANN) model the biological nervous system and are
widely used in pattern classification, intrusion detection, and statistical analysis. ANN are
one of the most commonly used classifiers for intrusion detection systems [lix,lx,lxi,lxii,lxiii].
In [54], the authors use a neural network combined with an analytic hierarchy process.
The experimental results of this research show that the artificial neural network is
suitable to solve multiple issues of intrusion detection systems such as regular updating,
detection rate, false positive rate, false negative rate, suitability and flexibility. In [56],
Fan et al. describe different ANN based classifiers such as Multilayer Perception (MLP)
[lxiv], Generalized Feed-Forward (GFF), Modular Neural Network (MNN), Jordan/Elman
network (JEN), Principal Component Analysis (PCA) Network [lxv], Self Organized
Maps (SOM) [lxvi], and Recurrent Network (RN) [lxvii].
Decision trees are another useful technique for pattern classification. A decision
tree consists of non-leaf nodes and leaf nodes. Each non-leaf node represents a test over
an attribute and each leaf node corresponds to a class of decision result. There are many
algorithms for the decision tree which includes ID3 [lxviii], C4.5 [lxix] and CART [lxx].
Most decision tree algorithms implement a top down strategy, i.e. from the root to the
leaves. There are two steps in the decision tree classification: constructing the tree and
applying the tree to a dataset. There are many works using decisions tree to detect attacks
and malicious behaviors. Sheen et al. [lxxi] combine the decision tree algorithm and a
feature selection algorithm by using KDD99 dataset. In [lxxii], Juan et al. apply the C4.5
algorithm to build a decision tree based intrusion detection system.
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SCADA-Specific Intrusion Detection
The Computer Science Laboratory at SRI International developed a model based
intrusion detection system [lxxiii] for MODBUS TCP protocol based SCADA networks.
This research applied three model based detection algorithms to monitor MODBUS TCP
traffic. The first algorithm is the protocol-level model, which is used to characterize
MODBUS TCP requests and responses based on the expected characteristics of
MODBUS specified in [lxxiv] [lxxv]. This algorithm focuses on detecting invalid MODBUS
function codes, dependent fields such as data addresses, the number of data items, and the
length of packets, since these features may indicate reconnaissance attacks or Denial of
Service attempts. The protocol-level model applies customized Snort rules [lxxvi] to detect
violations of the above specifications. The second algorithm is the expected
communication patterns model which specifies expected MODBUS TCP protocol based
network communication patterns. This algorithm aims to detect attacks that violate these
expected patterns. The last algorithm is a learning-based approach for detecting changes
in server or service availability. This algorithm checks server and service availability by
using a Bayesian network to detect Denial of Service attacks. This research provides the
systematic approach to build the model based intrusion detection system on MODBUS
TCP based SCADA network. The experimental validation shows that the model based
IDS are effective for detecting attacks in the SCADA network. However, model based
IDS could cause many false alarms.
Linda, Vollmer and Manic [lxxvii] use the combination of a neural network
learning algorithm, the Error Back-Propagation algorithm [lxxviii], and the LevenbergMarquardt algorithm [lxxix] to build an intrusion detection system for critical
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infrastructures. This research used software tools such as Nmap, Nessus [lxxx] and
MetaSploit [lxxxi]to generate intrusion packet records. The network features used to train
the neural network in this paper are derived from the packet header and include the target
address, and the function code. One technique used in this research is Window Based
Feature Extraction. This algorithm captures a number of neighboring packets in a single
vector to calculate statistical features. Some significant window based attributes are the
number of IP address in the window, the time length of the window, and the average
interval between packets. These attributes are selected since they can describe a network
traffic record accurately. The experimental result of this work provides evidence that
neural network based intrusion detection is a promising approach for monitoring process
control systems.
Yang et al [lxxxii] apply the Auto Associative Kernel Regression (AAKR) model
and the Statistical Probability Ratio Test (SPRT) to design an intrusion detection system
for a simulated SCADA system. AAKR is a nonparametric, empirical modeling method
that uses historical observation to output classification decisions for new instances. The
SPRT was introduced in [lxxxiii], which was used to decide whether a new instance is
normal or abnormal. In order to simulate a SCADA system, the authors used several SUN
servers and workstations to setup the system. They used the continuous system telemetry
harness (CSTH) [lxxxiv][lxxxv], which was developed by Sun Microsystems to monitor the
server activity and build an initial profile of the system’s normal working status. The
method used in this research is pattern matching. This technique is used to detect
anomalies by analyzing deviations from normal behaviors in the network. The traffic
profile is created to describe the normal behavior which consists of link utilization, CPU
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usage, and login failure. The instance consists of these predetermined behaviors that
represent SCADA network behavior. The AAKR model is used to predict the “correct”
version of the new instance. The correct version is compared with past observations
which present normal behaviors, and the result is input to SPRT model to decide whether
it is abnormal. The experimental results show that this intrusion detection system can
detect anomalous behaviors in the SCADA network efficiently. However, the real
SCADA network traffic profile may be different from traffic available from this
simulated system. Furthermore, the authors consider the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) as the most important data source of the network traffic statistics,
which may not applicable for a real SCADA network.
Oman and Phillips [lxxxvi] designed an intrusion detection and event monitoring
system for a SCADA network to monitor the settings changes on SCADA devices and
monitor malicious commands sent to a RTU. This method uses XML to describe system
information details about the SCADA device such as IP address, telnet port, and legal
commands for the device. Each command has an entry in the RTU’s XML profile. A Perl
program parses that profile and creates a Snort signature for that command. The second
component of this IDS is device settings change monitoring. The device settings change
monitoring component is implemented by maintaining a settings repository for the
SCADA network. Each device has one or more baseline settings files in this repository.
Device settings will be compared with predetermined and protected baseline settings.
This IDS also provides revision control in order to archive settings for later review and to
help guard against operator error. Furthermore, this work provides uptime monitoring by
verifying whether a command succeeds. If the command is succeeds then the path is
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healthy. This intrusion detection and event monitoring systems is useful to the SCADA
system operators as well as for securing the SCADA system. However, this work current
only detects and monitors malicious behaviors against an RTU. It doesn’t provide any
detection solution to protect the MTU.
Carcano et al [lxxxvii] present an approach for intrusion detection for a SCADA
system based on multidimensional critical state analysis. The fundamental methodology
is monitoring the evolution of the SCADA system’s state. In order to track and analyze
the evolution of a SCADA system, four elements are needed. The system description and
critical state representation use the Industrial State Modeling Language (ISML). The state
evolution monitor tracks the evolution of the system state by sniffing the network traffic
between the master and the slave to gain the information about the system. This work
measures the Manhattan Distance between the current state and the critical state in a
boiling water reactor system. The experimental results include the false positive rate and
the false negative rate, memory usage performance, and packet capturing performance.
The results show this research is effective as a SCADA system IDS. However, the attacks
in this work only include malicious behaviors which will lead the system to critical state.
In real attacks against a process control system, attackers need to identify the devices in
the network first and then launch other types of attacks. Some attacks will not force the
system into a critical state. These attacks must still be detected. In order to detect attacks
against a SCADA system, the IDS should detect all classes of attacks or multiple IDS
should be used to detect all classes of attacks.
Zhang et al [lxxxviii] created the Smart Grid Distributed Intrusion Detection System
(SGDIDS) for a three layer smart gird network by using a support vector machine (SVM)
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classifiers and a artificial immune system (AIS) classifier. This research divides the smart
grid into three layers, home area networks (HAN), neighborhood area networks (NAN)
and the wide area network (WAN). The SGDIDS has an intrusion detection module to
detect security threats in each layer. The distributed intrusion detection system consists of
multiple intelligent modules; the information acquisition module (IAM) gathers the
network traffic and energy consumption information. The Data Segmentation module
(DSM) and the Preprocessing Module (PM) processes the data to make it suitable for the
detection algorithm. The analyzing module (AM) detects malicious intrusions. SVM
[lxxxix] was chosen as the classification algorithm due to the fact that it is highly accurate.
An artificial immune system is also selected to make a comparison with SVM algorithm.
To evaluate the performance of the intrusion detection system, The KDD99 dataset [xc]
was used to evaluate the performance of the intrusion detection system. This research
shows that the SVM algorithm based intrusion detection system can detect attacks
targeting a smart grid network and the architecture of the SGDIDS is a promising
approach for monitoring the smart grid network traffic. However, the KDD99 dataset is
based on communication in computer networks, not on the smart grid. The protocols, the
architecture of the network and the features of the records are significantly different. The
KDD99 dataset cannot show the real behavior of a smart grid network.
Valdes and Cheung [xci] use a learning based communication pattern anomaly
detection technique to detect anomalous network traffic patterns from a process control
system. This approach is based on the assumption that the process control systems have
fairly regular communication patterns between the master and the slave, as well as a
static device address space. The IDS classifies network traffic into normal, anomalous,
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and attacks using an adaptation of the pattern anomaly detection technique [xcii]. This
approach checks patterns in a stream of packets by using the competitive learning
algorithm. If a pattern matches existing patterns, according to a similarity function
returning a value above a specified threshold, then the library pattern wins. The pattern is
a vector of features such as source and destination IP address and destination port. The
IDS maintains a database of recent and historical network flow profiles in order to
evaluate the current pattern. The anomalous network flow in this work includes scanning
the network using the Nmap and the vulnerability analysis using the Nessus and
modifying data points on a MODBUS server. The detection results of the flow anomaly
detection show that this IDS is able to detect anomalous flows effectively. However, this
work includes limited attack traffic since most of the anomalous traffic is derived from
scan activities. In addition, the authors do not provide the false positive rate for the IDS.
Linda, Manic and McQueen [xciii]present the Known Secure Sensor Measurements
(KSSM) method to detect malicious false control system state by using physical
measurements. This research applied a subset of secure physical measurements that are
sent in sequence after unsecure measurements used for control. The comparison of the
selected subset value and KSSM values reveals potential malicious false data. The KSSM
system consists of a KSSM control module and the communication network. The KSSM
control module consists of Signal Analyzer and the Sensor Selector. The Sensor Selector
uses a number of sensors each time randomly and Signal analyzer monitors selected
sensor data and detects malicious false data injection. The experimental results shows the
selection algorithm of KSSM can demonstrate the current pattern of the network traffic
and the show the speed of the KSSM data in different bandwidth setting profiles.
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However, authors didn’t give the detection rate performance of the KSSM. Furthermore,
this paper only demonstrates that the KSSM can detect false measurement attacks in the
process control system.
Rrushi and Kang [xciv] adapted the estimation algorithm using a statistical
approach for anomaly based intrusion detection in SCADA systems. The algorithm
evaluated the malicious credibility of the payload based on checking the effect the packet
will have on a variable. The variables including input register variables, holding register
variables, etc of control systems are stored in a matrix. The attack credibility is calculated
by using applied logistic regression analysis and maximum likelihood estimation [xcv].
The probability is used to classify the element vectors in the matrix as normal or
abnormal. An experimental evaluation was implemented using a MODBUS TCP protocol
based test bed using MatPLC modules [xcvi]. MatPLC is a PLC simulation program for
Linux operating system. The attacks in this evaluation include shellcode injection, stack
buffer overflow, heap buffer overflow, pointer overwrites, array out of range, and inertial
attack [xcvii]. The false positive rate is zero and the detection rate is 98% which is very
good. However, this experiment uses a small simulated system. The authors do not
demonstrate the algorithm’s efficiency in a large scale process control system.
Chee et al. [xcviii] present a anomaly based intrusion detection algorithm that can
be used to detect malicious behaviors in substation control system. In their former
research, the proposed RAIM model [xcix] was introduced. The RAIM was used to
monitor and detect different types of malicious behaviors such as bad password and large
file transfer. In this paper, the authors cited four attack patterns of attack against power
systems: intrusion reconnaissance, modify the file system, modify the target’s settings,
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and change the target state. A vector which includes four weight factors is used to model
the four patterns mentioned above. A matrix stores a historical set of vectors for the same
substation. The intrusion possibility is calculated based on the distance between
maximum and average of values of a row vector. The experimental results of this
research show the vulnerability possibility and other system information such as how a
attacked substation can make more attack effort on the entire power system. However,
this research does not include detection rate and false positive rate result.
Table 2

Comparison of the SCADA Intrusion Detection

NAME OF
SYSTEM

PUBLISH DETECTION IMPLEYEAR
PRINCIPLE MENT

SRI Modbus[lxxiii] 2007

Specification yes

NNIDSCI[lxxvii]

2009

Anomaly

yes

AKKRSPRT[lxxxii]

2006

Anomaly

yes

IDAEM[lxxxvi]

2008

Signature

yes

Multidimensional2011
CSA[lxxxvii]
SGDIDS[lxxxviii] 2011
Pattern
2009
detection[xci]

Specification yes

THREAT
PROTOCOL
MODEL
gain access,
reconnaissance,
Modbus
attack host and
server
use Nmap,
Nessus,
N/A
MetaSploit
DOS attack
simulated by
SNMP
SUN servers
attack on RTU
N/A
simulated attack
on critical state of Modbus
system

Anomaly

yes

KDD 99

N/A

Anomaly

yes

reconnaissance Modbus

KSSM[xciii]

2012

Anomaly

yes

N/A

Statistical
parameter
estimation[xciv]

false data
injection

2009

Anomaly

yes

overflow
exploits

Modbus

RAIM[xcviii]

2011

yes

change system
setting, file
IEEE C37.118
system and
status

Anomaly
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Table 1summarizes the recently published SCADA-Specific intrusion detection
systems presented in this chapter. A generic drawback of these research works is their
threat models only include subsets of the attack classes presented in this work;
reconnaissance, measurement injection, command injection, and denial of service. Each
work also used unique datasets created by the researchers specifically to evaluate the IDS
presented in each paper. Exploit coverage is very limited for each of the datasets
presented in Table 2. Some of them only have reconnaissance attack to the process
control system, while some of them only include response injection attack. The malicious
behaviors in these datasets don’t cover some very critical attacks. For this reason, it is
very hard to measure the performance of the presented IDS. Since each IDS is evaluated
with a unique dataset it is impossible to compare the IDS. This literature search
highlights two needs for SCADA security IDS research. First, there is a need for a
comprehensive taxonomy of attacks against SCADA control systems. Second, datasets
which include normal SCADA system network traffic and traffic captured during attacks
is needed. Such datasets should be provided to researchers in the SCADA IDS field to
provide a common means for comparison of different IDS approaches. This dissertation
provides comprehensive attack taxonomy, describes datasets created to support IDS
research needs, and provides an evaluation of two IDS approaches for SCADA security
systems
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CHAPTER III
EXPLOITS ON SCADA SYSTEMS

SCADA systems are widely used in different critical infrastructures, such as water
distribution, gas transmission, and nuclear power plants. Outside attackers with
knowledge of the specific control system or insiders can launch attacks against
applications of the SCADA system. Attackers may perform malicious command injection
attacks to take control of the remote devices such as RTU. This type of attack may push
the system into a critical state, damage field equipment, or cause financial loss if the
attack leads to incorrect process operation. Intruders can also launch malicious false data
injection attacks against HMI software which can hide real conditions of remote field
equipment, or mislead operators into taking wrong actions based on the false system
information such as measurement, field equipment status.
Many protocols used in SCADA systems lack security features. Attackers can
perform passive reconnaissance attacks such as traffic analysis and eavesdropping.
During reconnaissance attacks, attackers can gather control system network information,
map the network architecture, and identify device characteristics such as manufacturer,
model number, supported network protocols, system addresses, and system memory
maps.
DOS attacks aim to stop the proper functioning of the SCADA system. Attackers
can flood meaningless packets to the network to interrupt communication between MTU
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and RTUs to make devices unavailable, break the feedback control loop and stop the
sensors from reporting the latest measurements. Many devices such as switches and
programmable logic controllers (PLC) in SCADA networks have vulnerabilities due to
the fact that these devices have limited resources. Many industrial switches are
vulnerable to simple denial of service attacks. There are many attacks which target
specific PLC. For example, attackers may send malicious payloads to shut down or
restart the network module of a PLC or an attacker may send malicious payloads to shut
down or restart the CPU module of a PLC.
This dissertation describes network vulnerabilities of three SCADA systems; a
gas pipeline, a water storage tank, and a chemical processing station. The water storage
tank control system models oil storage tanks found in the petrochemical industry.
Petrochemical refineries use oil and oil byproducts to produce gasoline, kerosene, diesel,
and many types of plastics. In a common configuration, oil arrives by sea and is pumped
into oil storage tanks to provide a consistent supply of oil to the refinery operation. Oil
storage tank control systems similar to the one modeled by the water tank control system
are used to monitor oil inventory and distribute oil to refinery processes. The gas pipeline
control system models a gas pipeline used to move natural gas or other petroleum
products to market. The chemical processing control system models a chemical mixing
operation. Chemicals from two tanks are mixed in a third tank following a recipe defined
by an operator using human machine interface software.
Serial Communication Based Control Systems
The MSU SCADA security laboratory (henceforth called the lab) was used to
develop a set of SCADA control system exploits. The lab contains five laboratory scale
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SCADA control systems [c]. Each SCADA control system includes Control
Microsystems, INC SCADA Pack Light PLCs as MTU and RTU. The MTU is connected
via RS-232 serial port to a PC running the OE IFIX human machine interface software.
The MTU and RTU are connected wirelessly using integrated Freeware 900MHz radios.
The MTU and RTU can be configured to communicate using DNP3, MODBUS ASCII,
or MODBUS RTU communication standards. The five laboratory scale control systems
model a gas pipeline, a factory assembly line, a water tower, a water storage tank, and an
industrial blower. All five control systems are mechanically functional models.

Figure 2

Serial communication based control systems

Figure 2 shows a high level schematic of the five serial port control systems. A
single HMI is used to control all five control systems. The control systems may be
operated individually or simultaneously in any grouping.
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The HMI used with the serial port control systems is GE/Fanuc iFix. The HMI
provides an interface for an operator to monitor and control the water storage tank
system. The GE/Fanuc iFix HMI supports three communication protocol MODBUS
ASCII, MODBUS RTU, and DNP3. All three communication protocols are primarily
command response based protocol. A master node, in this case the HMI, sends
commands to slave nodes, the individual RTU, which execute the command and then
provide a response. Commands include requests for information such as reading values
stored in system registers and required changes to system state (via changing system set
point registers).
The HMI forwards MODBUS commands to the MTU which in turn forwards
commands to the RTU. The MTU is configured as a repeater. The MTU includes two
EIA-232 UARTs. The first UART is connected by serial port cable to the HMI host. The
second serial port UART is connected to an industrial900 MHz radio. Commands from
the HMI are received on the HMI port and forwarded to the radio port. The industrial900
MHz radio is also a repeater which wirelessly broadcasts commands and responses to
other radios in the network(there is one radio for each RTU). Responses from RTU are
handled in a similar manner except information flows in the opposite direction.
The MTU and RTU are identical Control Microsystems, Inc. SCADAPack LP
PLC. Each PLC is controlled by firmware. Firmware may be written as Ladder logic, in
ANSI C, or maybe a combination of both. As mentioned above, the MTU PLC is
configured as a repeater; the MTU copies commands and responses received from the
HMI port to the radio port or vice versa. Each RTU PLC contains custom ladder logic to
control an individual physical process.
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The RTU ladder logic for the five serial port control systems use a common
configuration. The RTU includes input registers, also known as setpoint registers. The
HMI software makes changes to setpoint register values to control the physical process.
Common setpoint register types include, mode settings, actuator (valve, breaker, and
switch) settings, and process parameter settings (maximum and minimum valves)for
controlled process parameters, PID settings, etc. RTU also include output registers.
Output registers contain measured values from the physical process and state information
for actuators in the control system. Output registers may be connected to analog inputs to
the RTU, digital inputs to the RTU, or be driven by ladder logic or C firmware.
Water Storage Tank Control System
The water storage tank control system models oil storage tanks found in the
petrochemical industry. Petro chemical refineries use oil and oil byproducts to produce
gasoline, kerosene, diesel, and many types of plastics. In a common configuration, oil
arrives by sea and is pumped into oil storage tanks to provide a consistent supply of oil to
the refinery operation. Oil storage tank control systems similar to the one modeled by the
water tank control system are used to monitor oil inventory and distribute oil to refinery
processes. Water was substituted for oil for safety reasons.
The water storage tank control system contains primary storage tank and
secondary water storage, a pump to move water from the secondary tank to the primary
tank, a gravity fed manual relieve valve which allows water to flow from the primary to
secondary tank, and a sensor which provides the water level in the primary tank as a
percentage of total capacity. The secondary tank is not a feature of an industrial oil
storage tank. The secondary tank is used to provide a destination for water when it leaves
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the primary tank and a source for water to fill the primary tank. The water tank control
system is a closed loop.
The water tank RTU ladder logic includes 6 setpoint registers; HH, HI, LO, and
LL water level setpoint register, a pump override setpoint register, and a mode setpoint
register. The RTU ladder logic also includes 3 output registers which store process
parameters; pump state, water level, and alarms tate.
An operator uses the HMI to monitor and remotely control the water storage tank.
The operator can place the system in automatic or manual mode. In both modes, the HMI
polls the RTU every two second. Each poll is performed by a MODBUS command being
sent from the HMI to the RTU. The MODBUS command requests to read the alarm state,
the pump state, and the water level. The same MODBUS command includes values for
the 6 setpoints, HH, HI, LO, LL, pump override, and mode. Each time a command is
received from the HMI, the RTU updates all setpoints with values from the command and
responds to the read request. A single RTU response returns the alarm state, pump state,
and water level. If the communication link between the MTU and RTU is broken the
RTU will continue operating with the last configured setpoints.
The water storage tank includes manual and automatic control modes. In
automatic mode, the RTU ladder logic program attempts to maintain water level between
the Land H setpoints using an ON/OFF controller technique. When the RTU ladder logic
program detects that the water level has reached the L level it turns on the water pump.
When RTU ladder logic program senses that the water level has reached the H level it
turns off the water pump. If the manual relief valve is open the water level in the tank
will oscillate between the H and L setpoints continuously. If the relief valve is closed the
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water level depends on the pump state at the time of closing. If the pump is on when the
relief valve is closed, the water level will rise to the H setpoint and the pump will turn
off. The water level will remain constant until the relief valve is re-opened. If the pump is
off when the relief valve is closed, the water level will remain constant until the relief
valve is re-opened. If, due to a system fault, the water level rises to the HH setpoint or
falls to the LL setpoint an alarm is triggered. The alarm sounds at the water storage tank.
In manual mode, the pump state is controlled manually by the HMI. An operator can
manually activate or deactivate the pump and manually activate. In manual mode the
HMI continues to poll the RTU to read process settings and conditions every second. If
due operator error, the water level rises to the HH setpoint or falls to the LL setpoint the
alarm is triggered.

Figure 3

Water Tank Control System Schematic
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Gas Pipeline Control System
The gas pipeline control system models a gas pipeline used to move natural gas or
other petroleum products to market. Cyber penetration of control systems monitoring and
controlling a gas pipeline control systems can lead to loss of the visibility and loss of
control of the gas pipeline.
The gas pipeline control system contains a closed loop gas pipeline connected to
an air pump which pumps air into the pipeline. A manual release valve and a solenoid
release valve are available to release air pressure from the pipeline. A pressure sensor is
attached to the pipeline which allows pressure visibility at the pipeline and remotely on
an HMI screen.
Ladder logic is used to program the gas pipeline MTU and RTU. The MTU ladder
logic forwards commands and responses to the RTU and HMI respectively. The RTU
ladder logic includes ten setpoint registers; a system mode setpoint register, a control
scheme setpoint register, a relief valve open/close setpoint register, a pump on/off
setpoint register, a pressure setpoint register, a proportional integral derivative(PID) gain
setpoint register, a PID reset setpoint register, a PID rate setpoint register, a PID dead
band setpoint register, and a PID cycle time setpoint register. The system mode setpoint
register allows an operator to place the system into manual, automatic, or off states. The
control scheme setpoint allows an operator to select between pressure control using a
pump on/off scheme or a relief valve open/close scheme. The relief valve open/close
setpoint allows an operator to manually control the relief valve. The pump on/off setpoint
allows anoperator to manually control the pump. The pressure setpoint provides a target
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gas pressure in pounds per square inch(PSI). The PID gain, reset, rate, dead band, and
cycle time setpoints configure the system using a PID feedback control mechanism.
The RTU ladder logic also includes three output registers which store process
parameters; pressure measured in PSI, pump state, and relief valve state. The gas pipeline
control scheme includes automatic and manual modes. In automatic mode, the RTU
ladder logic program attempts to maintain gas pressure at the pressure setpoint using a
PID control scheme. The control variable is either the state of the relief valve or the state
of the pump depending upon the control scheme setpoint. In manual mode, the gas
pipeline pump and relief valve are controlled manually through the HMI by an operator.
Ethernet Based Control System
Many modern control systems use Ethernet based communications
infrastructures. The trend of using Ethernet based communications for control systems
has led to increased cyber security awareness and research and development in the
control system domain. The Ethernet network based testbed includes a chemical
processing system in the MSU SCADA security laboratory.
In a chemical processing factory, in order to follow a chemical mixing recipe, one
or more materials need to be sent to a reactor under certain conditions such as
temperature and pressure. The chemical processing control system testbed in the lab
models a chemical reactor in chemical plant. Water was substituted for chemical
materials for safety reasons. The structure of the testbed is illustrated in Figure 4.
The testbed contains a reverse tank, reactor tank A and reactor tank B, a water
level sensor in each tank to measure the percentage of the water in the tank, valves
controlled by the PID controller and flow meters in each water pipe, and emergency
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valves. Water in tank A and tank B simulate two types of chemical materials in a reactor.
In a common configuration, chemical materials will be sent to the reactor in a certain
percentage. For instance, material A will be 25% and material B will be 75% during the
process. The water in tank A and tank B reaches the respective setpoints to simulate two
materials reaching their percentage requirement.

Figure 4

Structure of Chemical Processing System Testbed

The controller ladder logic in the chemical mixing testbed includes a water level
setpoint register, water level register, pump state register, flow speed register and alarm
state register. The PID control scheme is used to control of tank A and tank B. The PID
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controller attempts to maintain water level at the water level setpoint. When the controller
detects the water level is close to the setpoint, it causes an offtake valve to reduce the
flow speed. The reverse tank’s function is to provide water to tank A and tank B. The
pump in the reverse tank pumps water to tank A and tank B. Another PID controller
maintains the reverse tank water level. When water in tanks A and B reach their
respective setpoints, the controller will adjust valves to ensure the water flow speed into
tank A and B equals the water flow speed into the reverse tank.
Figure 5 shows the network topology of the chemical processing system testbed.
An operator uses Human Machine Interface (HMI) software to monitor and remotely
control the testbed. The protocol between HMI PC and Master is Common Industrial
Protocol (CIP). The master exchanges information with PLCs though Siemens switch.
Note: In the figure, SE-Switch stands for Siemens switch. In order to add device and
protocol diversity to testbed two different brands of PLCs and protocols are implemented
in this testbed.
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Figure 5

Network Topology of Chemical Processing System Testbed

The PLC in the left of Figure 5 is a Siemens Simatic S7 300 PLC which is widely
used in process control systems. The Siemens Simatic S7 300 PLC uses the PROFINET
protocol, which is based on industrial Ethernet. There are over three million PROFINET
devices are used in the industrial area [1]. The switch and master support the EtherNet/IP
protocol. In order to implement two different protocols in one system, a protocol
convertor is added. The function of the protocol convertor is to allow the Siemens
Simatic S7 300 PLC to communicate with the switch and the other devices in the system.
The PLC on the right of the Figure 5 is an Allen-Bradley Micrologix 1400 PLC
(In the figure, RL-Switch stands for Allen-Bradley Micrologix 1400 PLC), which uses
the EtherNet/IP protocol. The Industrial Ethernet Protocol (Ethernet/IP or EIP) is an
open industrial network standard that applies the CIP protocol by encoding CIP messages
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in Ethernet frames. EIP is built on the standard TCP/IP protocols. EIP was developed by
Rockwell Automation and is now managed by the Open DeviceNet Vendors Association
(ODVA).
Attacks on Serial Communication Based Control Systems
In this section a set of cyber-attacks against industrial control systems (ICS) are
grouped into four attack classes; reconnaissance, response injection, command injection,
and denial of service. The response injection class is further divided into naïve malicious
response injection (NMRI) and complex malicious response injection (CMRI) attacks.
The command injection class is further divided into malicious state command injection
(MSCI), malicious parameter command injection (MPCI), and malicious function code
command injection (MFCI) attacks. Table 3 lists 28 individual attacks described in this
paper and lists each attacks sub-class. This section defines the four classes and their subclasses and provides detailed descriptions of each attack listed in Table 3.
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Table 3

List of Attacks against MODBUS Industrial Control Systems
Attack
Index
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

Name
Address Scan
Function Code Scan
Device Identification
Points Scan
Memory Dump
Naïve Read Payload Injection
Invalid Read Payload Size
Naïve False Error Response
Negative Sensor Measurement(s)
Sensor Measurement Grossly Out of Bounds
Sporadic Sensor Measurement Injection
Random Sensor Measurement Injection
Constant Sensor Measurement Injection
Slope Sensor Measurement Injection
High Slope Measurement Injection
Low Slope Measurement Injection
Replayed Measurement Injection
Altered System Control Scheme
Altered Actuator State
Continually Altered Actuator State
Altered Proportional Integral Derivative
Parameter(s)
Altered Control Set Point
Force Listen Only Mode
Restart Communication
Clear Data Log
Change ASCII Input Delimiter
Invalid Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC)
MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming

Classification
Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance
Reconnaissance
NMRI
NMRI
NMRI
NMRI
NMRI
NMRI
NMRI
CMRI
CMRI
CMRI
CMRI
CMRI
MSCI
MSCI
MSCI
MPCI
MPCI
MFCI
MFCI
MFCI
MFCI
DOS
DOS

Reconnaissance Attack
Reconnaissance attacks gather control system network information, map the
network architecture, and identify the device characteristics such as manufacturer, model
number, supported network protocols, system address, and system memory map. This
section describes four reconnaissance attacks against MODBUS servers; the address
scan, the function code scan, the device identification attack, and the points scan. The
44

address scan discovers ICS servers connected to a network. The function code scan
identifies supported network operations which can be performed for an identified server.
The device identification attack allows an attacker to learn a discovered device’s vendor
name, product code, major and minor revision, et cetera. The points scan allows the
attacker to build a device memory map.
Attacks described in this section were implemented against MODBUS servers
because MODBUS is an open standard and is a popular network protocol used for ICS
devices. While these attacks are known to function against MODBUS servers the
vulnerabilities the attacks exploit are general enough to also likely be found in other
network protocols used by ICS.
Industrial control system users often develop standard hardware, software and
control scheme parameter configurations which are duplicated throughout a control
system. For example, an electric transmission system may use a standard panel which
includes the same protective relays used at many substations throughout a single
company’s transmission system. A second example is pump stations for a gas pipeline.
Pump stations are distributed along the gas pipeline to ensure product flow.
Programmable logic controllers (PLC) and the program on those controllers will be
similar throughout the system.
The combined results of the address scan function code scan, the device
identification attack, and the points scan can be used to generate a signature for
MODBUS servers common to a particular company, use case, or vendor. This signature
can then be used to build maps of discovered systems by company, by use case, or by
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vendor. Such signatures can also be used to build a database of vulnerabilities and
exploits for each aforementioned category.
Attack 1 is the Address Scan. MODBUS servers use either an IP address for
MODBUS/TCP systems or a single byte address for MODBUS RTU and ASCII systems.
Attackers can perform an address scan to identify MODBUS server addresses which are
in use. Each MODBUS server is assigned a unique address. MODBUS systems typically
have a static configuration in which the number of servers does not change and the
address assignment of the individual clients does not change. MODBUS/TCP servers can
have any legal IP address. MODBUS/TCP servers listen on TCP port 502.Statement 1
defines the legal address range for MODBUS RTU and ASCII systems.
∈{0,..,247}

(1)

The MODBUS protocol requires addressed servers to return a response code after
being addressed by a query. The response may be acknowledgement of a successful
transaction or indicate an error message. No response will be received for MODBUS
queries addressed to nonexistent servers. To identify MODBUS servers an attacker can
send MODBUS queries to each legal MODBUS address and wait for any response. Note,
for MODBUS RTU and ASCII systems the 0 address is for broadcast commands. No
response is sent for broadcast commands and therefore this address would typically not
be used for address scan attacks.
Attack 2 is the Function Code Scan attack. After MODBUS server addresses are
identified an attacker may wish to scan servers to identify supported function codes. The
MODBUS function code field is a single byte. MODBUS specifications define four types
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of function codes; public function codes, user defined function codes, reserved function
codes, and error function codes. Statement 2 lists the set of public function codes.
∈ 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,11,12,15,16,17,20,21,22,23,24,43 ,43}

(2)

User defined function codes must be in the range defined by statement 3.
(3)
Reserved function codes are codes in the public code space which have been
used by legacy devices and which are not s upported as public code s. This set is
most often em pty. Reserved function

codes are in the range defined by

statement4.
(4)
When a MODBUS query generates an error at the MODBUS server an error
function code is returned in the response. The error function code is the query function
code + 0x80. An error function code exists for all legal function codes from statement 4
regardless of whether the underlying public, user defined, or reserved function code is
supported by the MODBUS server. Therefore MODBUS function code scans should not
scan the error function codes.
An attacker can perform a MODBUS function code scan by sending a query to all
function codes in the sets defined by statement 4. MODBUS query payloads vary by
function code. However, an attacker need not form a proper payload for each function
code to determine if a function code is supported by a MODBUS server. Function code
scans can be grouped into two categories by the function code scan attack. If the function
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code is not supported an exception code 1 (invalid function code) response will be
returned. All other responses, whether indicating an error or transaction success, indicate
the function code is supported by the targeted server.
Attack 3 is the Device Identification attack. Attackers can also fingerprint remote
devices to learn specific information such as the vendor name, product code, and revision
number. This information can be used to search for known vulnerabilities in exploit
databases such as Exploit Database (EDB) [ci] or to download exploit scripts targeting to
the identified and fingerprinted system.
MODBUS servers may implement a function code to allow a client to read device
identification information. For MODBUS RTU and ASCII servers function code 0x11
allows an attacker to retrieve the current run status and additional information which is
device specific. Device specific contents may include sensitive information.
MODBUS servers implement second read device identification function code,
0x2B. There are three Read Device ID object types: basic, regular, and extended
information. Basic information is mandatory for all MODBUS servers and includes the
vendor name, the product code, and the major and minor revision. The regular
information is optional and includes the vendor uniform resource locator (URL), the
product name, the model name, and the user application name. The extended information
is optional and includes user defined objects.
Attach 4 is the Point Scan attack. In industrial automation programming points are
objects used to store programming variables or input values tied to sensors or output
values tied to actuators. Points can be accessed from within a program running on a
programmable logic controller (PLC) or programmable automation controller (PAC).
48

Points are also available for read and write access via network interfaces attached to PLC
and PAC. When the PLC or PAC is networked it acts as a server. A point scan is used to
identify implemented points within such a server. A point scan may also be used to read
the contents of implemented points to gain system intelligence.
For MODBUS servers, points are grouped into data blocks called coils, discrete
inputs, holding registers, and input registers. Coils and discrete inputs represent a single
Boolean bit, however, when accessed the legal values are 0x00 and 0xFF. Holding and
input registers are 16-bit words. Coils are read and write capable and discrete inputs are
only read capable. Holding registers are read and write capable and input registers are
only read capable. Each data block may have its own set of contiguous address space or
the data blacks may share a common memory address space. This choice is vendor and
device specific.
Points scans should are performed after a function code scan to ensure that
function codes used by the points scan are valid. MODBUS points scans can be
performed with the following function codes; read coils (0x01), read discrete inputs
(0x02), read holding registers (0x3), read input registers (0x4), write single coil (0x05),
write single register (0x06), write multiple coils (0xF), write multiple registers (0x10),
and read/write multiple registers (0x17). A point scan for each of the above function
codes will be similar. Each provides different information.
A point scan first attempts to read from each legal location of each type of data
block and then attempts to write to each legal location of each type of data block. To
maximize the specificity of point scan results the smallest quantity of data should be used
for both the read and write scans. During the read scan two results are possible, assuming
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the function code has been pre-validated by a function code scan. First, exception code 1
indicates the address is invalid. This means this address is not valid for that type of data
block. Second, the read command is valid and a MODBUS packet with read results is
returned. During a write scan three results are possible, assuming the function code has
been pre-validated by a function code scan. First, exception code 1 indicates the address
is invalid. This should not occur if a read scan is performed first and invalid read
addresses are removed from the write scan. Second, exception code 3 indicates the
address is legal but the location is read only. This can occur if the write coil function is
attempting to write to a coil or if the write register function is attempting to write to an
input register. By performing read scans for each data block type followed by write scans
for each data block type an attacker can learn, for each legal address; whether the address
is available for use, is the address read only or read write capable, which functions can be
used to access the address.
In addition to creating a memory map for the MODBUS server, a read scan can be
used to make a copy of the devices memory contents. This memory image can be useful
in planning subsequent attacks.
Attack 5 is the Memory Dump attack. As mentioned above, points are used to
store programming variables and input values tied to actuators or output values read from
sensors. For many PLCs all points are readable via the network communications
interface. However, only points intended to store input values from an external source or
output values read by an external device should typically be read over the network. A
memory dump attack reads points associated with internal programming variables which
are not intended to be read over the network. A memory dump attack may be intentional.
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In this case an attacker may use a memory dump attack to gather critical information
about a system in preparation for a later attack. A memory dump attack may also be an
unintended result of a points scan.
Malicious Response Injection Attack
Industrial control systems commonly use polling techniques to continuously
monitor the state of a remote process. Polling takes the form of a query transmitted from
the client to the server followed by a response packet transmitted from the server to the
client. The state information is used to provide a human machine interface to monitor the
process, to store process measurements in historians, and as part of feedback control
loops which measure process parameters and take requisite control actions based upon
process state.
Many industrial control system network protocols lack authentication features to
validate the origin of packets. This enables attackers to capture, modify, and forward
response packets which contain sensor reading values. Industrial control system protocols
also often take the first response packet to a query and reject subsequent responses as
erroneous. This enables attackers to craft response packets and use timing attacks to
inject the responses into a network when they are expected by a client.
Response injection attacks take three forms. First, response injection attacks can
originate from control of a programmable logic controller or remote terminal unit,
network endpoints which are the servers which respond to queries from network clients.
Second, response injection attacks can capture network packets and alter contents during
transmission from server to client. Finally, response injections may be crafted and
transmitted by a third party device in the network. In this case, the response there may be
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multiple responses to a client query and the invalid response may assume prominence due
to exploiting a race condition or due to secondary attack such as a denial of service attack
which stops the true server from responding.
In this section multiple response injection attacks are discussed. The response
injection attacks are grouped into two categories; 1) Naive Malicious Response Injection
(NMRI) attacks and 2) Complex Malicious Response Injection (CMRI) attacks.
Naive Malicious Response Injection (NMRI): Naive Malicious Response
Injection (NMRI) attacks lack sophistication. NMRI attacks leverage the ability to inject
response packets into the network but lack information about the process being monitored
and controlled. NMRI attacks may send invalid payloads. For example, an attacker may
know have performed a set of reconnaissance attacks to learn system addresses, function
codes, and memory map, but lack specific details on what the monitored process is or
lack details on valid data contents for each point found on a server. In this case, the
attacker may craft a response injection attack with a payload of all zeroes, all negative
numbers, all very large numbers, or other likely invalid contents. Alternatively, NMRI
attacks may be based on limited process information. For example, an attacker may know
process details such as process limits or valid contents for each point found on a server
but not have the capability to craft more sophisticated attacks. For example, an attacker
may be able to cause an alarm. For this work, four NMRI attacks were developed.
Attack 6, Naïve Read Payload Size, is the first NMRI attack is based only on
network protocol knowledge. MODBUS read coil, discrete input, holding register, and
input register queries include a quantity field to specify the number of objects to be
returned by the server. An NMRI attack can craft malicious responses which include the
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correct quantity of returned objects which are all zeroes or all ones. Alternatively, the
NMRI can return the correct number of requested objects with random contents. Random
contents is particularly interesting for the read coils and discrete inputs cases since these
returned values are specified to be limited to only 0x00 and 0xFF for each coil or discrete
input.
Attack 7, Invalid Read Payload Size, is an NMRI attack based only in which the
requested number of objects from the read coils, discrete input, holding register, or input
register query is ignored. The response payload is either larger or smaller than the
requested amount. The response payload may be formed by trimming or extending a
valid payload, or by creating a payload with zeroes, ones, or random bytes.
Attack 8, Naïve False Error Response, is an NMRI attack in which falsified error
responses are returned to the client after a read command. For MODBUS an error packet
is formed by adding 0x80 to the function code followed by an exception code. Read
command exception codes are limited to 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, and 0x04. This NMRI attack
can send random exception codes which fall in the legal range or send random exception
codes which are outside the legal range.
Attack 9, Negative Sensor Measurements, is an NMRI attack which consists of
injecting negative process measurements. This attack was implemented for two
laboratory scale process control systems. First, for a gas pipeline system which measures
the gas pressure in a pipe, the attack sent negative pressure readings. Second, for a water
tank control system which measures the water level in a tank, the attack sent negative
water level readings. In both cases the attack requires prior knowledge of the address of
the gas pressure or water level field. The attack is also requires prior knowledge that the
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gas pressure or water level fields are floating point values. In normal operation, neither
gas pipeline pressure nor the water tank water levels take values less than zero.
Attack 10, Sensor Measurements Grossly Out-Of-Bounds, is an NMRI attack
which injects process measurements significantly outside the bounds of alarm set points.
For example, both the aforementioned process control systems include alarm set points
for gas pressure and water level respectively. These alarm level set points are named
“High High” (HH), the high level alarm, and “Low Low” (LL), the low level alarm.
Results of an attack which sends very low water level measurements are graphed in
Figure 6. In this graph, most measurements are between the low (L) and high (H) system
set points. The water tank control logic turns on and off a pump to keep the water level
between the L and H set points. The values labeled NMRI are falsified measurements
significantly below the LL set point. This is a naïve attack because the attacker may not
know the HH and LL set points but may simply send very large or very small values in
expectation of an alarm. It is also naïve because the falsified measurements are also
sporadic, where an actual system could not change water levels at the rates indicated by
the graph in Figure 6.
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Figure 6

NMRI Attack: Sporadic Low Level Measurements

Attack 11, Sporadic Sensor Measurement Injection, is an NMRI attack which
sends false process measurements outside the bounds of H and L control set points while
not outside the alarm set point range formed by HH and LL. For the attack used for this
work falsified water levels are sporadically sent to the MODBUS client. Both the water
tank and gas pipeline systems regularly have measurements outside the H and L limits
due to a time delay between measuring the gas pressure or water tank level and sending
the command to turn off the pump adding water or gas to the physical process. This
makes developing an automated intrusion detection rule based strictly on the H and L
limits difficult. However, this NRMI attack differs from the ordinary out of bounds
situation in that the response injection packets are sporadic in nature.
Attack 12, Random Sensor Measurement Injection, is an NMRI attack which
sends random process measurements for the gas pipeline pressure and water tank water
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level. Since these measurement values are random some falsified measurements are
within process limits (LL/HH and L/H limits) and some are not.
Complex Malicious Response Injection (CMRI) attacks add a level of
sophistication above that of the NMRI attacks. CMRI require understanding of the cyber
physical system being attacked. CMRI attacks attempt to mask the real state of the
physical process being controlled to negatively affect the feedback control loop managing
the cyber physical system. In this section five CMRI attack scenarios are discussed.
Attack 13, Constant Sensor Measurement Injection, is a CMRI attack in which the
attacker sends malicious packets containing the same measurement over a period of time
in order to mask the real state of the system. This attack will appear to the operator as a
constant level for a measured parameter. This attack reflects an incorrect state of the
system and may lead an operator or automated control algorithm to take incorrect control
actions. For example, in the water tank control system if a falsified water level is lower
than the L set point, an operator may attempt to use a manual control mode to increase
the water level when in actuality is already correct. This may lead to overflow in the
water tank. This attack can have similar impact on the gas pipeline control system. A
false low pressure response injected maliciously may lead an operator to attempt to raise
the pressure and result in physical harm to the pipeline. Alternatively, a false high
pressure response injected maliciously may lead an operator to attempt to lower the
pressure by turning off a pump or opening a relief valve. This could lead to loss of flow
in the pipeline and a resulting loss of gas distribution service.
Attack 14, Calculated Sensor Measurement Injection, is a CMRI attack in which
calculated process measurements are injected. This attack simulates a process
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measurement trend such as a water level or gas pressure increasing or decreasing. For
example, an attack can inject falsified response packets which simulate a water level
trend increasing from a normal level such as 20% to 100%. Such an attack would cause
the operator to turn off the water pump while the actual water level is 20% full. This
attack requires system knowledge and an accurate model of the system being attacked.
Attack 15, Replayed Measurement Injection, is a CMRI attack in which means the
attacker replays captured process measurements to the client to give the operator the
impression the system running normally.
Attacks 13-15, are designed to appear like normal process functionality. These
attacks can be used to mask other process changes such changes to process state through
malicious command injection attacks. Because these attacks project a state of normalcy
they are very difficult to detect.
Attack 16, High Frequency Measurement Injection, is a CMRI attack in which the
frequency of process measurement changes is increased beyond a normal rate. For
example, the falsified responses may indicate a fast rising water level or fast decreasing
gas pressure. This attack scenario may appear to match the system behavior common at a
different time of a day and may cause an operator to misconfigure the system to handle
the falsified demand. However, in the case of water or gas distribution, increased pump
speed may lead to overflow since demand is actually lower. Figure 7 shows a graph of
changing oil storage tank level measurements before and during a High Frequency
Measurement Injection Attack. In the figure, the frequency of liquid level changes is
normal at first (the left side of the graph) and then during the attack (right side of the
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graph) the liquid level rises and falls more rapidly. Such a change may simulate a period
of high demand.
Attack 17, Low Frequency Measurement Injection, is a CMRI attack in which the
frequency of process measurement changes is decreased below a normal rate. For
example, the falsified responses may indicate a slowly rising water level or slowly
decreasing gas pressure. This attack is similar to the high frequency CRMI attack except
the low frequency case simulates a period of low usage.

Figure 7

CMRI on Water Tank Storage Control System

Malicious Command Injection Attack
Command injection attacks inject false control and configuration commands into
a control system. Human operators oversee control systems and occasionally intercede
with supervisory control actions. Hackers may attempt to inject false supervisory control
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actions into a control system network. Remote terminals and intelligent electronic devices
are generally programmed to automatically monitor and control the physical process
directly at a remote site. This programming takes the form of ladder logic, C code, and
registers which hold key control parameters such as high and low limits gating process
control actions. Hackers can use command injection attacks to overwrite ladder logic, C
code, and remote terminal register settings.
The potential impacts of malicious command injections include interruption
process control, interruption of device communications, unauthorized modification of
device configurations, and unauthorized modification of process set points.
As mentioned in the response injection discussion above much industrial control
system network protocols lack authentication features to validate the origin of packets.
This enables attackers to capture and alter command packets. Additionally, attackers can
craft original command packets and directly inject them into the control system network.
In this section multiple command injection attacks are discussed. The command
injection attacks are grouped into three categories; 1) Malicious State Command Injection
(MSCI) attacks 2) Malicious Parameter Command Injection (MPCI) and 3)Malicious
Function Code Injection (MFCI).
Malicious State Command Injection (MSCI) MSCI attacks change the state of
the process control system abnormally to drive the system from a safe state to a critical
state by sending malicious commands to remote field devices. MSCI attacks may require
a single injected command or multiple injected commands.
Typically actuators, such as switches or valves, connected to physical processes
are connected to a digital or analog output connected to a remote terminal unit (RTU) or
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intelligent electronic device (IED). Each output connects to the cyber system by
modeling it as a digital point in a register. Changing the state of a bit or bits in such a
register has an immediate impact on the physical actuator. For example, a pump may
have an ON/OFF mechanism which is changed by writing a value to a bit a in a register
on a remoter terminal unit (RTU). Such registers can be manipulated by network protocol
write commands. For example, the MODBUS protocol includes write coil and write
register commands. An attacker who understands a device’s implementation specifics
including a memory map can craft a command to alter actuator states. Two examples of
MSCI attacks are provided.
Attack 18, Altered System Control Scheme, is a MSCI attack which changes the
control state of a gas pipeline control system from automatic mode to manual mode and
then turns on a pump which increases the pressure within the pipe. In this laboratory scale
control system programmable logic controller (PLC) with MODBUS-RTU server is
connected to a pump, a solenoid, and a pressure meter. In automatic mode the user sets a
target pressure and the PLC switches the pump between ON/OFF mode, and switches the
solenoid between OPEN/CLOSED modes to fire the solenoid to open and close the relief
valve which in turn controls the pressure in the pipe. In manual mode the pump state and
solenoid states are no longer controller by the PLC program and become directly
controlled by register values store in the PLC. MODBUS commands can be used to
change the values stored for system control mode, pump state, and solenoid state. To
implement the attack first a write register (MODBUS function code 03) command to
address 0xABCD is used to switch the control mode to manual. Next, a write register
command to address 0xABCD is used to turn on the pump. For the gas pipeline control
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system a pipe pressure above 60 PSI is considered a critical state. Pressure above this
value will potentially damage system components. Placing the system in manual mode
and turning on the pump causes the pressure to climb toward this critical value. An
operator monitoring the system with a human machine interface should notice the
climbing pressure and can take control to correct the issue. Additionally, the rising gas
pressure may trigger a process alarm to gain an operators attention.
Attack 19, Altered Actuator State, is an MSCI attack scenario which changes
system actuator states one time. For the gas pipeline system Altered Actuator State
attacks include command injections which turn the pump on or off and command
injections which open or close the relief valve. For the oil storage tank system an Altered
Actuator State attack was implemented to turn the pump on or off.
Attack 20, Continually Altered Actuator State, is an MSCI attack scenario which
changes system actuator states repeatedly to attempt to damage the actuator devices or
other system components. Two examples are provided for this paper. First, command
packets are continually transmitted to switch the state of the gas pipeline pump. This is
achieved by sending MODBUS write register commands continually inverting the bit
controlling the pump ON/OFF state. The second attack repeatedly transmits MODBUS
write register commands to invert the state of the solenoid controlling the relief valve. In
both cases repeatedly changing the state can lead to ware on the system and cause
component failures. This attack also can lead physical process into unknown and
potentially unsafe states. An operator monitoring the system with an HMI can observe
this attack in progress by the continuous state changes. However, since the attack relies
on a stream of commands changing the state of the pump or solenoid an operator will not
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be able to simple change correct the system state to fix the problem since a new attack
command will immediately follow and again alter the system state. As such preventing
such an attack will require stopping the attack at its source.
Malicious Parameter Command Injection (MPCI) Industrial control systems
often include tight control loops between the physical process, sensors and actuators, and
a programmable logic controller (PLC) directly connected to the sensors and actuators.
The PLC will include a program which monitors process sensors, computes a control
action, and then executes control actions via manipulating process actuators. Typically,
this control loop is setup as a distributed control system which can function without a
network connection to supervisory and monitoring systems. Set points are values written
into PLC registers which direct the PLC program. Examples of set points include high
and low set points on the gas pipeline. In automatic mode the PLC opens the relief valve
or turns of the pump, depending on another set point value, when the pressure reaches the
high set point. Malicious Parameter Command Injection (MPCI) attacks alter PLC set
points.
Attack 21, Altered Proportional Integral Derivative (PID) Parameter(s) changes.
PID controllers are tuned by setting multiple gain parameters to properly control the
system. Changing any of the PID parameters can cause the controller to perform incorrect
control actions. Typically, a process engineer tunes the PID controller during system
installation and then these parameters are left constant. However, the PID control
parameters are typically implemented as registers on the PLC and can therefore be altered
by a network command. The gas pipeline system uses a PID control scheme to manage
the pressure in the pipeline. For the gas pipeline system all PID parameters are stored in
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contiguous memory locations. A MODBUS write multiple registers command was used
to overwrite all PID parameters with invalid values. For the attack used with this work
all PID parameters were overwritten with zero values. This change has an immediate
noticeable impact on the gas pipeline causing the pump to repeatedly turn on and off at a
rate of approximately 3 times per second.
Attack 22, Altered Control Set Point, is an MPCI attack which changes device set
points. Set points are typically used to provide variable control over a system. For
example the oil storage tank system uses an ON/OFF control scheme to keep the amount
of liquid in a tank between a low set point and a high set point. A level sensor
continuously monitors liquid level as a percentage of tank full and turns a pump on an off
to add liquid to the tank. A MODBUS write register command was used to change both
the high and low set points. This attack also alter alarm values stored in PLC registers to
disable alarms by changing set points liquid level alarms to values in line with the altered
high and low set points.
Malicious Function Code Injection (MFCI) Application layer protocols
sometimes include commands which have unintended consequences when used by
attackers.
MODBUS function code 8, named “Diagnostics” includes three sub-function
codes, commands, which can be used to disrupt the client server communication link. The
original intent of the diagnostics function code was to provide a means to diagnose and
address communication issues. The diagnostics command is only required for serial port
MODBUS systems.
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Attack 23, Force Listen Only Mode, causes a MODBUS server to no longer
transmit on the network. The diagnostic function code, MODBUS function code 8,
includes a sub function code to force a MODBUS server into listen only mode. Many
industrial control systems use polling techniques in which the master node, such as
human machine interface (HMI) software, polls the MODBUS servers periodically for
data. The HMI displays data to human operators who may then take supervisory control
actions based upon the current state of the system. There also exist wide area control
schemes which poll MODBUS servers for data to support automated control actions. A
MODBUS server which is placed in listen only mode by an attacker will not respond to
queries and in the situations described will result in a loss of system visibility and control.
Attack 24, Restart Communication, sends a command which causes the
MODBUS server to restart which leads to a temporary loss of communication. The
diagnostic function code includes a sub function code to restart the remote device and
cause it to execute its power up diagnostic tests. This loss of communication leads to a
temporary inability to observe and control the process. During the restart period local
control from the program running on the field device is also lost. Multiple successive
restart communication attacks can lead to a near complete loss of communication with
and control over the process.
Attack 25, Clear Communications Event Log, clears the MODBUS server’s
communications event log. The restart communication command also includes an option
to clear a remote device’s communication event log. This attack may use to erase
evidence of a prior attack.
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Attack 26, Change ASCII Input Delimiter, changes the delimiter used for
MODBUS ASCII devices. MODBUS ASCII devices use ASCII characters as delimiters
to identify the start and end of packets. The change ASCII input delimiter command can
be used to change the ASCII character which denotes the end of a packet. A Change
ASCII Input Delimiter Attack changes this delimiter without the knowledge of the
MODBUS client which normally communicates with the MODBUS server. This attack
requires the ability to penetrate the communication link between the client and server.
Penetrating of such a serial link is possible when vulnerable wireless radios or other
intermediary communication systems are used to connect the client and server.
Denial of Service Attack
Denial of Service (DOS) attacks against industrial control system attempt to stop
the proper functioning of some portion of the cyber physical system to effectively disable
the entire system. As such DOS attacks may target the cyber system or the physical
system. DOS attacks against the cyber system target communication links or attempt to
disable programs running on system endpoints which control the system, log data, and
govern communications. DOS attacks against the physical system vary from the manual
opening or closing of valves and switches to destruction of portions of the physical
process which prevent operation. This work concentrates on DOS attacks against the
communication system. Two DOS attacks were developed for this work.
MODBUS systems may be MODBUS TCP/IP, MODBUS RTU, or MODBUS
ASCII. MODBUS TCP/IP is a routable protocol which allows other devices to initiate
DOS attacks targeted to a victims IP address. MODBUS RTU and ASCII use RS-232 or
RS-485 physical layers. These serial port protocols are considered non-routable.
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However, MODBUS RTU and ASCII devices are vulnerable to certain DOS attacks.
RS-232 is a point to point protocol used for MODBUS connections over short distances,
typically less than 20 meters. However, control systems often connect a remoter terminal
unit or master terminal unit to a wireless radio using RS-232 then use the radio to
transmit across longer distances. Such radio links can be penetrated by attackers and can
therefore be the source of a DOS attack.RS-485 serial links allow multipoint network
topologies. In these cases a device on the network can become infected with malware and
then the infected device can initiate a DOS attack against other devices on the network.
Traffic jamming is a class of DOS attacks in which high volumes of traffic are
sent to a network endpoint. Attackers attempt to overwhelm the endpoint by either
sending transmissions faster than they can be processed or by sending packets crafted to
cause software errors which generate exceptions which crash the network stack, the
running program, or the operating system of the targeted device.
Attack 27, Invalid Cyclic Redundancy Code (CRC), injects a large number of
MODBUS packets with incorrect CRC. Packets with invalid CRC are rejected by both
MODBUS servers and clients. The victim device must check the CRC of each packet. A
flood of packets with invalid CRC scan overwhelm a device and cause it to crash or the
flood may stop communication with other legitimate devices via loss of ability to
transmit and/or receive packets.
Attack 28, MODBUS Master Traffic Jamming, is a traffic jamming attack in
which a non-addressed slave transmits out of turn. MODBUS RTU and ASCII systems
often are configured with a single master connected to multiple slaves. When there are
multiple slaves only the addressed slave should respond to master queries. The MODBUS
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Master Traffic Jamming Attack is a traffic jamming attack in which a non-addressed
slave transmits out of turn. For RS-485 systems, in both the 2-wire and 4-wire cases, the
slave transmit wire is shared by all slaves attached to the bus. In this case, a slave
transmitting out of turn will cause a legitimate slave’s transmission to be garbled and lost
and result in a timeout and retransmission by the master. A MODBUS Master Traffic
Jamming Attack against a RS-232 system with wireless radio between the master and
slave node is described in [cii]. In this attack a wireless penetrator transmits continuously.
The proprietary wireless radio includes a carrier sense back off arbitration scheme which
causes legitimate slaves to continuously wait for a clear line to transmit. In laboratory
experiments, attackers were able to force a legitimate slave to stay idle ad infinitum.
Figure 8 plots water level measurements observed by a HMI connected to the
MODBUS master. The MI continuously queries the slave to read the water level. For this
experiment the water storage tank was set to keep the water level in the tank between
40% and 70% full by cycling a water pump which fills the tank. The tank was configured
to continuously drain water during the experiment. During normal operation the HMI
sees the water level rises to the high set point when the pump is on and drops to the slow
set point when the pump is off. Figure 8 shows the impact of the MODBUS Master
Traffic Jamming Attack from the perspective of the HMI. When the attack starts the HMI
no longer receives responses to its water level queries and therefore the water level in the
plot no longer changes. This loss of process visibility can cause an operator or automated
algorithm to misoperate the system. During this attack the master is also no able to
transmit commands. As such the operator may notice that something is wrong but is not
able to send commands to the remote system during the attack.
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Figure 8

DOS Attack on Water Storage System

Attacks on Chemical Processing Control System
The EIP protocol was released in 2001, and it was designed for exchanging real
time application messages in a process control system. EIP encodes the CIP message in
TCP frames. Typical devices which use the EIP protocol are PLCs, HMIs, and robot sand
IO adapters. The EIP protocol follows the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model. A
layer-7 protocol in the OSI model is illustrated in Figure 9. In the application layer, the
CIP protocol provides the application object library. In the presentation layer, it supports
messaging services. The session layer provides message routing and connection services.
EIP supports two types of message connection: explicit message connection and implicit
connection. Explicit Message connection is a point to point transaction between two
nodes using the TCP/IP protocol to access devices in the system. An implicit connection
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is a one to many connections to provide broadcast or multicast services using the UDP/IP
protocol over the Ethernet network.

Figure 9

The Ethernet/IP Protocol OSI Stack Representation

The normal EIP session generally follows a common set of steps. A client opens a
TCP connection to the port 44818 (EtherNet/IP port) on the server. The client then sends
a non-message command NOP to the server to test whether the server is reachable. The
NOP command is used to check the TCP connection status in the EIP protocol. Both the
server and the client can generate this command, and the receiver doesn’t respond to the
NOP command. Next, the ListIdentity command is optionally issued by the client using a
UDP broadcast to the network. The server responds to the ListIdentity command with the
device information such as vendor ID, serial number, device type etc. Next the client
sends the RegisterSession command to open a new session. The server responds with an
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EIP packet including a session handle. This completes the EIP session connection
establishment stage. Figure 10 shows the EIP protocol session establishment. The dashed
line means a message is optional. After the session is established, the client sends the
SendRRData command to request the server data. The server responds to the client’s
request with system information system such as sensor measurement readings or register
contents. EIP continues in this session transmission stage until a session is terminated. In
the EIP session termination stage, the client sends the UnregisterSession command to the
server to terminate the current session, and the session expires. Figure 10 shows the EIP
protocol session transmission and termination. The dashed line in Figure 10indicatesthat
the service is not necessary for every session.

Figure 10

EIP Session Connection Stage
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Figure 11

EIP Data Transmission and Session Termination

Three major sources of vulnerabilities in the EIP protocol are identified. The
vulnerabilities will be addressed in te

rms of attacks in

order to analyze the

potential threats of the vulnerabilities.
Reconnaissance Attack
Due to the fact that the EIP protocol lacks an authorization mechanism, attackers
can craft Listidentity packets to broadcast in the control system network to retrieve EIP
protocol based device information. The Listidentity command was discussed in the
previous section. After broadcasting a ListIdentity packet, devices will respond with
information as follows: device IP address, EIP port number, vender ID, device type
which specifies the device belongs to a communication adapter or PLC, product code,
revision, status, serial number, product name length, product name and state.

71

EIP packets are sent in plain text and therefore an attacker can see this
information during the reconnaissance attack stage. This vulnerability can be used to
analyze process control system network topology, identify the gateway address or switch
address and subsequently launch other attacks such as Denial of Service attacks against
these nodes. The attacker also can use device information to identify already known
hardware and software vulnerabilities from vulnerability databases.
An exploit was created to test this vulnerability in the SCADA lab. A hand crafted
ListIdentity command packet was created. The crafted packet format is showed in in
Table 4. An example of the ListIdentity packet is showed under the Table 4.The crafted
EIP packet was broadcasted using the UDP protocol. The UDP port number used was
44818.

Table 4

EIP Packet Format
command length Session status Sender options
handle
content

Command: (0x0063) List Identity
Length: 0
Session handle: 0x00000000
Status: success
Sender content: 0x0000000000000000
Options: 0x00000000

After receiving the packet, the devices will report their identity information to
attacker. In the chemical processing control system testbed, there are three devices (the
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master, the RL-PLC and the protocol convertor) based on EIP protocol, each of them
responded with one ListIdentity response packet including the device details listed above.
The protocol convertor identity information is shown in Table 5 as an example (vender
ID is stricken from this report). The other two devices identity information formats are
similar to the information in Table 5.

Table 5

Device Identity Information
Item name
Vendor ID
Device type
Product code
Revision
Status
Serial number
Product name
length
Product name
state

Item value
--- --- --- --- --Communication
adapter
120
17.02
0x0060
0x1a27317f
23
1769-L35E
Ethernet Port
0x03

As described in the last section, this reconnaissance attack may allow attackers to
gain device information to formulate future attacks against a SCADA system. During the
reconnaissance attack stage, an attacker will obtain device information and search
vulnerability databases to find weaknesses of a device or system. For example, some
types of PLCs have vulnerabilities on their CPU modules and Ethernet modules, the
attacker can send malformed packets to reset the CPU module or the Ethernet module.

73

Denial of Service Attack
Two types of DOS attacks against the EIP protocol were developed. The first
attack is a packet flooding attack. The second is a EIP Session Handle Hijacking Attack.
Packet Flooding: The concept of the packet flooding type of Denial of Service
attack is to prevent th e legitimate remote device’s system infor mation from
reaching the master. The PLC or the pro

tocol convertor reports the sensor

measurement reading to the master.
In order to launch the DOS attack, the attacker flood smalformed EIP packets to
stop information exchange. The malformed packet format is similar the protocol shown
in Table 4 except the contents of the packet are as follows:
Command: (0x0063) List Identity
Length: 0
Session handle: 0x00000000
Status: success
Sender content: 0x0000000000000000
Options: 0x00000000
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Figure 12

Chemical Processing System HMI

This attack floods malformed EIP command packets to the SCADA network in
order to consume the remote device’s resources such as CPU memory and process or
bandwidth and network bandwidth. In the chemical processing control system network,
the PLC and the communication protocol convertor use UDP multicast to transmit sensor
measurement reading information. Due to the fact that each EIP multicast packet includes
an EIP sequence number, the next sequence number is the current value plus one. The
receiver will check the sequence number before receiving the packet. The malformed
packet includes an incorrect EIP sequence number. The flood of malformed packets
interrupts the normal network traffic flow and blocks real multicast packets leading the
master to lose communication with each PLC. The HMI software loses the current system
information. Figure 12 shows the part of HMI software before and during the DoS attack.
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In the left side of Figure 12the HMI software shows a normal situation. The normal HMI
screen shows remote device communication status, valve and pump status, and the water
measurement value, and flow speed. During the DoS attack, critical system information is
blocked by the flood of malformed packets. The HMI software loses the ability to
monitor the state of the physical system. The right side of Figure 12 shows the HMI with
blank graphical areas and error messages where system status information is normally
shown.
EIP Session Handle Hijacking Attack: There are two requirements for of the EIP
Session Handle Hijacking Attack. First, the attack requires the ability to spoof a
legitimate HMI PC or master IP addresses on the SCADA network. Second, the attack
requires the ability to calculate the next TCP sequence number. The first requirement is
needed so that the attacker can inject malicious traffic and the second is required for the
so that packet will appear legitimate.
The high level idea of this attack is to terminate the EIP session connection
between the HMI PC and the master. The key to this attack is that the terminate session
packet has to be sent after the EIP session is established. To achieve this, the attacker
uses a reconnaissance attack to identify device’s function in the network and sends the
terminate session packet with correct TCP SYN number.
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Figure 13

EIP Session Handle Hijacking Attack

Figure 13 illustrates the attack sequence. Here we assume the EIP session is
already established. The victim HMI PC first initiates the EIP SendRRData command to
request the system state information, the malware discovers the session handle by
continuously sniffing the commands from the HMI PC. Once the session handle, the
malware starts to predict the next TCP SYN sequence number. Next the malware spoofs
the HMI PC IP address and sends a malformed Unregister Session packet to the master.
The format of the message is similar to the protocol described in Table 3 and the content
of this message is as follows:
Command: (0x0066)unresgister session
Length: 0
Session handle: (captured session handle)
Status: success
Sender content: 0x0000000000000000
Options: 0x00000000
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The receiver closes the current TCP/IP connection when it receives the malicious
command packet. The attacker needs to spoof the HMI PC and response this request to
close the TCP/IP connection. After closing a new EIP session, the HMI PC may initiate a
new EIP session; the malware can terminate it again continuously.
This chapter discussed cyber-attacks against both serial based and Ethernet based
SCADA networks. The work in this chapter includes introducing the classification of
attacks on serial based SCADA network and the classification of attacks on Ethernet
based SCADA networks. Also this chapter discusses vulnerabilities of SCADA network
protocols and the effects of attacks on the SCADA systems.

78

CHAPTER IV
SCADA DATASETS

The KDD Cup 1999 dataset [xc] provides a labeled dataset for intrusion detection
researchers in the information technology (IT) security area. The KDD Cup 1999 dataset
includes about 5 million connection records which are labeled as normal connection
records or as one of four categories of attacks: probing attacks, denial of service (DOS)
attacks, user to root (U2R) attacks, and remote to local (R2L) attacks. Each record is
about 100 bytes in length. Each connection record includes 41 attributes such as time
duration, protocol type, service name, etc. Probing attacks are information gathering
attacks which map the network to gather information, such as which services are
available, which ports are open or what type of operating system runs on the target host.
DOS attacks can lead hosts to run out of computing capability or memory resources so
that they refuse to service legitimate requests. U2R attacks aim to improve an attacker's
authority to root. R2L attacks aim to gain local access from remote machines. The KDD
Cup 1999 dataset is used as a benchmark to validate different intrusion detection
classification algorithm’s performance. The training dataset includes 494,021 instances,
in which Probe attacks comprise 4,107 (0.83%) instances, DOS attacks comprise 391,458
(79.24%) instances, the R2L attacks comprise 1,126 (0.23%)instances, U2R attack
comprise 52 (0.01%) instances and normal scenarios comprise 97,277 (19.69%)instances.
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The KDD Cup 1999 dataset is a widely used public dataset for evaluating
anomaly based intrusion detection systems. However, many researchers in the SCADA
security area use their own datasets to test intrusion detection systems. There is no
standard dataset which includes normal network traffic and attacks against a SCADA
network which can provide researchers a benchmark to compare SCADA IDS
performance. This chapter documents a dataset created to allow researchers a common
platform to evaluate the performance of data mining and machine learning algorithms
designed for intrusion detection systems for SCADA systems. The dataset includes
different classes of attacks which simulate different attack scenarios on process control
system networks. A common dataset provides IDS researchers with the following
benefits. First, not all researchers have access to SCADA equipment to generate their
own dataset. A common dataset will therefore allow more researchers to work in this
domain. Second, a common dataset allows researchers to independently validate other
researcher’s results. Third, a common dataset allows the performance of different
algorithms to be compared which should lead to more efficient more accurate intrusion
detection system designs over time.
The datasets created for this work are stored in the Attribute Relationship File
Format (ARFF) for use with the Waikato Environment for Knowledge Analysis (WEKA)
[ciii]. WEKA is a comprehensive framework of state-of-the-art machine learning
algorithms. WEKA allows researchers to compare or verify new machine learning
algorithms. WEKA is not only a collection of machine learning techniques, but also can
incorporate new algorithms. WEKA provides various built-in classification algorithms,
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such as Bayes Network classifier, Radial Basis Function (RBF), Decision Tree, Neural
Network, etc.
There are a number of data mining, machine learning and statistical projects that
use or wrap WEKA. There are many tools that use WEKA for text analysis such as
TagHelper [civ] which can be used to analyze conversational data such as email or chat
logs. The BioWeka [cv] project is used for knowledge discovery and data analysis for
biologists. The BioWeka project developed a WEKA extension to use various formats of
bioinformatics datasets in WEKA. WEKA is also widely used in distributed data mining
projects. Weka4WS [cvi] is a framework that was developed for a distributed data mining
algorithm on a Grid system. Weka-Parallel [cvii] is a platform based on WEKA which
provides cross-validation for classification algorithms.
The organization of the dataset produced for this dissertation is similar to the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset’s organization. Each instance in the dataset represents one
captured network transaction pair. Each entry represents a merged MODBUS query, a
client (MTU) to server (RTU) transaction and a response, a server (RTU) to client (MTU)
transaction. An instance in the dataset describes network traffic information and the
current state of the process control system via content features. Each instance is a row in
the dataset and each instance consists of multiple columns. Each column represents the
value of a feature or attribute. There are two groups of features in the dataset; network
traffic features and content features. Each instance also includes a label which is the class
of attack or “normal” if the instance is not part of an attack. All features are discussed in
detail in this chapter.
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Table 6

SCADA Dataset Indices and Descriptions
Dataset Index
I
II
III
IV

Description
Gas pipeline system full dataset
Water storage tank system full dataset
Gas pipeline system reduced size (10%) dataset
Water storage tank system reduced size (10%) dataset

The SCADA network dataset includes four datasets from two serial based process
control systems. Dataset I includes transactions from a gas pipeline system and dataset II
includes transactions from a water storage tank system. Dataset I contains79556 instances
and dataset II contains 193667 instances. The datasets are generated from network flow
records captured with a serial port data logger in a laboratory environment. A second set
of reduced size datasets were also created. Dataset III is a gas pipeline system dataset
with 10% of the instances of Dataset I. Dataset IV is a water storage tank system dataset
with 10% of the instances of Dataset II.
The two smaller datasets are provided to reduce memory requirements and
processing time when validating classification algorithms. The smaller datasets provide
researchers an option to verify the classification algorithms quickly and easily. The
smaller datasets were created by sampling the larger datasets. Instances in the smaller
datasets were randomly selected from the larger datasets with the constraint that the
proportion of each class of attack is the same in the larger and smaller datasets.
All four datasets are available online at
http://www.ece.msstate.edu/~morris/icsdatasets to make them available to other
researchers.
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Communication data logs in SCADA networks not only describe network traffic
patterns such as remote device address, function code, etc., information in the payload of
the packets also provide a description of the control flow or state of the control system.
There are two categories of features in the dataset; network traffic features and content
features. Network traffic features describe the communication pattern within the control
system. Compared with enterprise IT networks, process control system network
topologies are static and the services provided by network attached devices (MTU and
RTU) are regular. Some attacks against control systems may change the communication
pattern in the network, so network traffic features are used to describe the normal traffic
pattern and detect malicious activity. Network traffic features include the device address,
function code, length of packet, packet error checking information, and the time interval
between packets. Second, content features describe the current state of the control system.
This information is contained in the payload of the packet. Content features characterize
the behaviors of different nodes in the control system. These features provide the
potential to detect attacks that cause nodes such as the MTU or RTU to behave
abnormally. Content features include sensor measurements, supervisory control inputs,
and distributed control decisions. Sensor measurements vary by system. The attacks
described in this paper were implemented and exercised against laboratory scale gas
pipeline and water storage tank control systems. Sensor measurements used were gas
pressure measured in pounds per square inch (PSI) for the gas pipeline and water level
measured as a percent of tank fullness for the water storage tank. Supervisory control
inputs include set points, PID parameters, system mode, and pump on/off input.
Distributed control decisions include pump state, relief valve state, and alarm states.
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Ten network traffic features were developed. The first and second network traffic
features are the command device address and response device address. Each MODBUS
server has a unique address. For MODBUS serial communication the device address is
the device ID of the target device or server, aka, the RTU. The command device address
in the command packet should match the response device address in the response packet.
This feature is primarily intended to aid in the classification of reconnaissance attacks.
MODBUS servers are assigned fixed device addresses. MODBUS serial systems are
configured such that all slaves see all master transactions. As such the slave must check
the device address before acting upon a packet. The set of device addresses seen by a
slave is limited and fixed according to the configuration of the system. Command device
addresses or response device addresses which are not in the common set will appear as
anomalous.
The third, fourth, fifth and sixth network traffic features are command memory,
response memory, command memory count and response memory count. For MODBUS
servers, points are grouped into data blocks called coils, discrete inputs, holding registers,
and input registers. Coils and discrete inputs represent a single Boolean bit, however,
when accessed the legal values are 0x00 and 0xFF. Holding and input registers are 16-bit
words. Coils are read and write capable and discrete inputs are only read capable.
Holding registers are read and write capable and input registers are only read capable.
Each data block may have its own set of contiguous address space or the data blacks may
share a common memory address space. This choice is vendor and device specific. The
command memory and response memory are coil or register read/write start positions in
command packet and response packet. The command memory count feature and response
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memory count feature are the number of points to be read or written. These memory
features can be used to describe the memory operation behaviors in the network traffic.
The seventh and eighth network traffic features are the command packet length
and response packet length. The MODBUS Protocol Data Unit (PDU) is limited to 253
bytes. With the added device ID and CRC fields a MODBUS RTU packet may be 256
bytes. However, MODBUS communications between a master and slave typically are
very repetitive. Typically, a small set of read and write commands are used. For the gas
pipeline and water storage tank systems used for this work the master repeatedly
performs a block write to a fixed memory address followed by a block read from fixed
memory address. The read and write commands have fixed lengths for each system and
the read and write responses have fixed lengths for each system. However, many of the
attacks described in the first section of this paper have different packet lengths. As such
the packet length feature provides a means to detect many attacks.
The ninth network traffic feature is the time interval. The time interval is a
measurement of the time between the MODBUS query and the subsequent MODBUS
response. The MODBUS protocol is a request-response protocol. During normal
operation the time interval will vary only slightly. Malicious command injection attack
and malicious response injection attacks and DOS attacks often will result in significantly
different time interval measurements due to the nature of these attacks.
The tenth network traffic feature is the command/response cyclic redundancy
code (CRC) error rate. This feature is a measurement of the rate of CRC errors seen in
command and response packets. The command/response CRC error rate characterizes the
command and response packet CRC error checking error rate. Because the SCADA
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network traffic pattern is regular, the normal command and response CRC error rate is
expected to stay in a certain range. For a normal system this rate will be very low. This
rate will increase when a system is subjected to a DOS attack such as the Invalid CRC
attack.
The content features are different between gas pipeline control system dataset and
water storage system dataset. The gas pipeline control system uses a proportional integral
derivative (PID) control scheme and the water storage system tank uses an ON/OFF
control scheme. A common set of content features are listed in Table 7. Water storage
tank system specific features are listed in Table 8. Gas pipeline system specific features
are listed in Table 9. Extended descriptions of the features are provided under each table.
Table 7

Common Features for All Datasets

Feature Name
command_address
response_address
command_memory
response_memory
command_memory_count

Feature Type
Network Traffic
Network Traffic
Network Traffic
Network Traffic
Network Traffic

response_memory_count
command_length
response_length
crc_rate
time
comm_read_fun
comm_write_fun
response_read_fun
response_write_fun
sub_function
measurement
control_mode
pump state
manual pump setting
label

Network Traffic
Network Traffic
Network Traffic
Network Traffic
Network Traffic
Content
Content
Content
Content
Content
Content
Content
Content
Content
Classification

Description
Device ID in command packet
Device ID in response packet
Memory start position in command packet
Memory start position in response packet
How many memory bytes need to be R/W in
command
How many memory bytes need to be R/W in response
Total length of command packet
Total length of response packet
CRC error rate
Time interval between two packets
Value of command read function code
Value of command write function code
Value of response read function code
Value of response write function code
Value of sub function code in the command/response
Water level or pipeline pressure
Automatic mode, manual mode, or system off setting
Pump state
Manual mode pump setting
Manual classification of this instance
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The first five common content features are command read function code,
command write function code, response read function code, response write function code
and the sub function code. The function code feature allows the IDS to classify instances
of uncommon function codes as anomalous.
The sixth common content feature is the process measurement. This feature
provides the current measurement value of the water tank water level as a percentage of
tank fullness or gas pipeline pressure in pounds per square inch (PSI). Naive malicious
response injection attacksand complex malicious response injection attack will influence
the process measurement during the attack. This feature aids in detection of these
response injection attacks.
The seventh common content feature is system control mode. This feature is
captured from a command packet. The system control mode places the system in auto,
manual or shut down (off)modes. The value 0 represents off, the value, 1 represents on in
manual mode, and the value 2 represents on in automatic mode. In automatic mode a
ladder logic program in the programmable logic controller (PLC) connected to the system
controls the system. In manual mode control is taken from manual override settings. One
type of malicious state command injection attacks tries to modify the system working
mode or shut down the system. This feature aims to specify the system working mode
during one certain operation stage.
The eighth common content feature is the pump state. Both the gas pipeline and
water storage tank systems use a pump to add air or water to the system to meet the target
set point. This feature directly represents the pump state. If this feature is 1 then the
pump is on and if this feature is 0 then the pump is off. When a system is in automatic
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mode the pump state is controlled by the ladder logic program in the PLC connected to
the system. In manual mode the pump state is controlled by the manual pump setting
which is described below. One type of malicious complex response injection tries to
modify this value in order to mask the actual pump working state. This feature can be
used to describe the pump state switch sequence during the normal operation and during
attack.
The ninth common content feature is the manual pump setting. This feature is
captured from a command packet. The manual pump setting indicates the intended pump
state if the system control mode is manual. This setting is ignored when the control mode
is set to automatic. Malicious state command injection attacks may change the pump
working mode continually or intermittently.
Table 8

Unique Features for Water Storage System Datasets
Feature Name
HH
H
L
LL

Feature Type
Content
Content
Content
Content

Description
Value of HH setpoint
Value of H setpoint
Value of L setpoint
Value of LL setpoint

There are four content features specific to the water storage tank system: HH, H,
L and LL. These features are related to the water level set point in water storage system.
In automatic mode, the RTU ladder logic program running in the PLC connected to the
water storage tank attempts to maintain water level between the Land H setpoints using
an ON/OFF controller scheme. When the RTU ladder logic program detects that the
water level has reached the L level it turns on the water pump. When RTU ladder logic
program senses that the water level has reached the H level it turns off the water pump.
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The water storage tank includes a manual drainage valve which if open allows water to
drain out of the tank. If manual drainage valve is open the water level in the tank will
oscillate between the H and L setpoints continuously as the pump cycles on and off to
add water to the tank as the water drains. If the manual drainage valve is closed the water
level depends on the pump state at the time of closing. If the pump is on when the manual
drainage valve is closed, the water level will rise to the H setpoint and the pump will turn
off. The water level will remain constant until the manual drainage valve is opened. If the
pump is off when the manual drainage valve is closed, the water level will remain
constant until the manual drainage valve is opened and the water level subsequently
drops to the L level. If, due to a system fault, the water level rises to the HH setpoint or
falls to the LL setpoint an alarm is triggered on the human machine interface used to
monitor the water storage tank. In manual mode, the pump state is controlled manually by
the HMI. An operator can manually activate or deactivate the pump. The manual pump
setting feature represents the manual control choice. In manual mode the HMI continues
to poll the RTU to read all set points and measurements every second. If due to operator
error, the water level rises to the HH setpoint or falls to the LL setpoint the alarm is
triggered. The water level set point features describe the ordinary system operation
settings. Various malicious command injection attacks aim to modify these set points.
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Table 9

Unique Features for Gas Pipeline System Datasets

Feature Name
set point
control_scheme
solenoid state
gain
reset
deadband
rate
cycletime

Feature Type
Content
Content
Content
Content
Content
Content
Content
Content

Description
Target gas pressure in the pipe in pounds per square inch
Control scheme of the water storage system
Solenoid to open gas relief valve state
Gain parameter value of PID controller
Reset parameter value of PID controller
Deadband parameter value of PID controller
Rate parameter value of PID controller
Cycletime parameter value of PID controller

The first content feature unique to the gas pipeline is the set point which is the
target gas pressure in PSI. In automatic mode, the RTU ladder logic program running in
the PLC connected to the gas pipeline attempts to maintain the air pressure in the gas
pipeline using a PID control scheme. The mechanism used by the PID controller to
control pressure depends upon the control scheme feature. The control scheme feature
selects whether the pump or a solenoid controlled relief valve is used to control the
pressure in the pipe. If the control scheme is 0 then the pump is used to control pressure
and if the control scheme is 1 then the solenoid controlled relief valve is used to control
pressure. With the pump control scheme the pump is turned on and off by the PID
controller. With the pump control scheme changes in air pressure are relatively slow
since the pressure only drops due to system air leakage which is minimal. With the
solenoid controlled relief valve air is allowed to escape the system based on the solenoid
feature. With the solenoid controlled relief valve air pressure changes more rapidly since
the relief valve allows air to escape at a higher rate than just leakage alone. The solenoid
state feature is the state of the solenoid. The state of the solenoid is controlled by the PID
controller in automatic mode and matches the solenoid setting in manual mode.
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There are five content features related to the PID controller. This group of
features control PID controller’s behavior, which includes gain, reset, rate, dead band,
cycle time. These PID parameters should be kept fixed during the system operation. One
type of malicious parameter command injection may try to modify these parameters in
order to interrupt the normal control operation discussed in the above section. This
feature is potential to describe the difference between normal operation and this type of
malicious parameter command injection attack.
The last feature for each instance in all datasets is the label. This feature provides
a manual classification of each instance. Table 10 lists the eight possible label values.
Table 10

Instance Classification Values

Label Name
Normal
NMRI
CMRI
MSCI
MPCI
MFCI
DOS
Reconnaissance

Label
Numeric
Value
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Description
Instance not part of an attack.
Naive Malicious Response Injection (NMRI) attack
Complex Malicious Response Injection (CMRI) attack
Malicious State Command Injection (MSCI) attack
Malicious Parameter Command Injection (MPCI) attacks
Malicious Function Command Injection (MFCI) attacks
Denial of Service (DOS) attacks
Reconnaissance attack

Normal traffic is labeled with the value 0. Normal traffic includes all network
packets which are not part of an attack. Naive Malicious Response Injection (NMRI)
attacks are labeled with 1. Naive Malicious Response Injection (NMRI) attacks lack
sophistication. NMRI attacks leverage the ability to inject response packets into the
network but lack information about the process being monitored and controlled. NMRI
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attacks may send invalid payloads. A single NMRI attack consists of one dataset instance
since this attack injects one malicious payload per attack.
Complex Malicious Response Injection (CMRI) attacks are labeled with 2. CMRI
attacks add a level of sophistication above that of the NMRI attacks. CMRI require
understanding of the cyber physical system being attacked. CMRI attacks attempt to
mask the real state of the physical process being controlled to negatively affect the
feedback control loop managing the cyber physical system. A single CMRI attack
consists of multiple dataset instances since this attack injects a large number of packets
per attack.
Malicious State Command Injection (MSCI) attacks are labeled with 3. MSCI
attacks change the state of the process control system abnormally to drive the system
from a safe state to a critical state by sending malicious commands to remote field
devices. A single MSCI attack consists of one or multiple dataset instances.
Malicious Parameter Command Injection (MPCI) attacks are labeled with 4.
Industrial control systems often include tight control loops between the physical process,
sensors and actuators, and a programmable logic controller (PLC) directly connected to
the sensors and actuators. MPCI may craft invalid controller parameter set points. A
single MPCI attack consists of multiple dataset instances since this attack changes the
controller parameter constantly.
Malicious Function Command Injection (MFCI) attacks are labeled with 5. MFCI
attacks can be used to disrupt the client server communication link. A single MFCI attack
consists of multiple dataset instances.
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Denial of Service (DOS) attacks are labeled with 6. DOS attacks against industrial
control systems attempt to stop the proper functioning of some portion of the cyber
physical system to effectively disable the entire system. A single DOS attack consists of
multiple dataset instances.
Reconnaissance attacks are labeled with 7. Reconnaissance attacks gather control
system network information, map the network architecture, and identify the device
characteristics such as manufacturer, model number, supported network protocols, system
address, and system memory map. A single MSCI attack is consists of one or multiple
dataset instances depending upon the reconnaissance attack scan speed and scan range.
The dataset instances are labeled as normal or by attack class, rather than by the
individual attack names from Chapter III. This labeling scheme was chosen to match the
KDD Cup 1999 dataset style which labeled by attack class than by a more specific label
noting an exact exploit. Attacks in each attack class have similar exploit methods and
similar impacts on the process control system.
This chapter describes four datasets which can be used to evaluate performance of
data mining and machine learning algorithms for intrusion detection systems in SCADA
systems. This network dataset includes different classes of attacks that simulate different
attack scenarios on process control system networks. The datasets described in this
chapter were used to evaluate the performance of an anomaly based intrusion detection
system described in Chapter V.
The datasets described in this chapter are relevant to other industrial control
systems (non-MODBUS, non-gas pipeline, or water tank system). The features in the
dataset are divided into two groups: network traffic flow and content. Other industrial
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control system protocols divide packets into network traffic related fields and content
fields. Other protocols include similar though not identical network traffic information
such as addresses, function codes, payload, and check sums. Many other industrial
control system protocols also follow query response traffic patterns similar to MODBUS.
The content features in the provided data set include remote commands and measured
system state. Other systems will include similar items which are monitored and updated
at similar rates. As such, the dataset described in this chapter can provide a benchmark to
measure accuracy of data mining or machine-learning algorithm intrusion detection
systems.
Reconnaissance, injection, and denial of service attacks are not unique to SCADA
networks. Similar vulnerabilities exist against enterprise networks and small office home
office networks. As such, the datasets described in this chapter are also relevant to nonindustrial control system intrusion detection system research.
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CHAPTER V
SCADA NETWORK INTRUSION DETECTION

Critical infrastructures are exposed to serious vulnerabilities that can be exploited
by attackers. Research on cyber threat and vulnerability analysis shows the security
challenges and the secure approaches in SCADA networks. There have been several realworld documented incidents and cyber-attacks affecting SCADA system, which clearly
illustrate critical infrastructure vulnerabilities. These reported incidents demonstrates that
cyber-attacks on SCADA systems might produce a variety of financial damage and can
be harmful events to humans and the environment.
There are many security mechanisms that can secure process control system such
as access control, authorization etc. These solutions are required in the defense in depth
for process control systems. However, none of them are completely secure. Attacks
continue to defeat security mechanisms to penetrate systems and execute attacks against
confidentiality, integrity and availability. Because current security mechanisms can never
be 100% secure, intrusion detection systems are needed to monitor attacks in progress.
It is hypothesized that building a SCADA system intrusion detection dataset to
evaluate SCADA IDS performance is possible through the SCADA system threat model
analysis and different exploiting methods for both serial based and Ethernet based
SCADA network. Most SCADA systems are designed for using over a long period, the
topology of SCADA networks is static and the network communication traffic pattern is
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regular. Therefore intrusion detection systems can use traffic patterns to detect abnormal
communication traffic. Furthermore, process control systems are based on the feedback
control loop, the system measurements are inputs to the controller such as PID controller.
Based on the system current measurements, system setting parameters and controller
parameters, the next measurements can be predicted.
SCADA networks are real time systems. Typically the availability is important
and computer capability and memory resources in SCADA devices are limited. In order
to monitor the network traffic and detect malicious behaviors in process control systems
while changing the SCADA infrastructure’s protocol or architecture at minimum cost, an
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is required in the SCADA network.
There are two main types of detection techniques known as signature based
detection and anomaly based detection. The signature based IDSs apply the attack
signature database to determine whether the signature has been triggered. It is effective
when detecting known attacks and with low false positives. Anomaly based detection
uses mathematical techniques such as machine learning or data mining to check the
deviations from the predefined normal behavior model. Anomaly based detection may
detect new attacks.
The signature based intrusion detection approach monitors and matches the traffic
record to known misuse patterns or rules to detect rules violations. Snort [xxviii] is an
open source signature based network intrusion detection system. This research applies
Snort IDS with signature rules combined with system state prediction rules to detect
malicious behaviors in SCADA networks.
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Anomaly IDS uses statistical models or machine learning algorithms to classify
network traffic as normal or abnormal (or into smaller sub-classes). Various model types
or classifiers can be used to build the anomaly IDS. This research applies Bayesian
networks, neural networks and decision trees to classify network transactions as normal
or abnormal. A decision tree algorithm is selected due to the fact that it is one of most
useful techniques in deterministic classification. Bayesian network is a fundamental
statistical approach to the problem of pattern classification. Neural network is also a
widely classification algorithm in intrusion detection system. So these three classification
algorithms are selected in this research.
This research builds a SCADA system intrusion detection system through the
SCADA system threat model analysis and different exploiting methods both serial based
and Ethernet based SCADA network. Most SCADA systems are designed for using a
long period, the topology of SCADA network is static and the network communication
traffic pattern is regular. So intrusion detection system can use traffic pattern to detect
abnormal communication traffic.
Anomaly Based Intrusion Detection Result
This section describes the detection results of anomaly IDS in serial
communication based process control system. We used a decision tree to classify network
transactions as normal or abnormal. A decision tree consists of non-leaf nodes and leaf
nodes. Each non-leaf node represents a test over an attribute and each leaf node
corresponds to a class of decision result. There are many algorithms for decision trees
which includes ID3 [cviii], C4.5 [cix] and CART [cx]. Most of the decision trees algorithms
implement a top down strategy; i.e. from the root to the leaves. There are two steps in the
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decision tree classification: constructing the tree and applying the tree to the dataset. In
this research, C4.5 algorithm was selected because it is most representative and it is
evolved from ID3 algorithm. The performance of the detection was measured by the
detection rate and the false positive rate. Detection Rate (DR) represents the number of
malicious packets that can be detected divided by the overall number of intrusions. False
Positive rate (FP) is the number of normal packets that are detected as anomaly divided
by the overall number of normal packets. The features discussed in last section are used
as input to IDS.
The work not only use the first and second group of features discussed in last
chapter, but also use prediction feature category.
Predictive features are calculated from the present system state using a physical
model of the control. The basic idea of these features is to construct a feedback control
model to describe the predicted system behaviors. Predictive features for process control
systems include predicted sensor measurements. Based on the control system model, the
input is the last sensor reading values received by MTU, and the control system’s setting
and the output is the predicted system measurements. The Next predictive feature is the
predicted trend of system state which characterizes whether the predicted system state
will go to another state or keep in the same one. The trend of system state includes
measurement changing speed, derivative of process measurement. For example, it
describes whether the measurement is increasing or decreasing or staying in a valid range.
Predictive features include the following features:
Speed: Describes the increasing or decreasing rate of the gas pressure in the
pipeline. Malicious complex response injection such as slow or fast response injection
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may influence the measurement speed which is showed in HMI. This feature is potential
to describe the difference between normal measurement changing in the response
injection attack.
Derivative of process measurement: Characterizes the changing rate of the gas
pressure speed. For example, in the gas pipeline control system the gas pressure changing
rate is dependant on the current pressure value, the pump state, the valve state etc. It
cannot increase the leakage speed when the pump is off and the valve is closed. This
feature will be used to specify the system measurements speed behavior and help to
detect malicious response injection attack.
Predicted measurement: This feature is an output of control system model, and the
input of the model is system settings and the last invalid measurement. It characterizes
the next value of the gas pressure. It is used to describe the distance between predicted
measurement and the actual measurement in the next control output which may have
contribution to detect malicious response injection attack.
Predicted speed: This feature is similar to the speed feature but it is computed
with predicted measurement, and can be used to describe the distance between predicted
speed and the actual measurement changing speed and may improve detection rate and
decrease false alarm.
The Table 11 shows the anomaly based intrusion detection results for gas pipeline
system and water storage system.
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Table 11

Anomaly Based IDS Result

Dataset
Recon

Gas Pipeline System
Detection Rate False Positive
92.9%
0.6%

Water Storage System
Detection Rate False Positive
93.1%
0.7%

naissance
NMRI
CMRI
MSCI
MPCI
MFCI
DOS
Normal

95.0%
97.0%
94.5%
94.5%
98.0%
100%
99.4%

0.8%
0.4%
0.7%
0.4%
0.2%
0.0%
1.3%

97.6%
96.7%
95.1%
97.0%
98.0%
100.0%
99.5%

1.8%
2.2%
2.1%
0.9%
0.3%
0.0%
0.9%

The hardware is used in this experiment is described as follow. The CPU is Intel
Core 2 Duo 2.26GHZ. The memory is 4G byte. The operating system is used in this
experiment is Ubuntu 12. The total number of instance in gas pipeline system dataset is
79556. The time to build the model is 36.83 seconds. The Kappa statistic is 0.9844. The
total number of instance in water storage system dataset is 193667. The time to build the
model is 77.07 seconds. The Kappa statistic is 0.9885. The performance of the detection
was measured by the detection rate and false positive rate. Detection rate represents the
ratio between the number of malicious packets that can be detected and overall number of
intrusions. False positive rate is the ratio between the number of normal packets that are
detected as anomaly and the overall number of normal packets.
The anomaly based IDS detection rate for reconnaissance attacks was 92.9% for
the gas pipeline control system and 93.1% for the water storage tank control system. A
review of the misclassified attack case shows that the instances in reconnaissance attack
class are well classified by the anomaly based IDS. The features in the training dataset
related with command/response address, command/response write and read function code,
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sub function code, command/response write and read memory are used for anomaly
based IDS to describe reconnaissance attack profile. The IDS failed to detect the
malicious packets that contain valid features information which listed above. During the
reconnaissance attack, the network traffic contains valid device address, function code
and memory address. The data mining algorithms will classify these instances as normal
class due to the reason that in the training stage, the number of normal instances with
valid features is much greater than the reconnaissance attack instance with valid features.
So the IDS will misclassify these malicious packets as normal packets and not trigger
alarms. The false positive rate for the reconnaissance attacks was 0.6% for the gas
pipeline control system and 0.7% for the water storage tank control system. This means
the anomaly based IDS misclassify the normal traffic or other types of attack as
reconnaissance attacks. This is due to the total number of reconnaissance attack instances'
low presence in the training dataset.
The anomaly based IDS detection rate for NMRI attacks was 95% for the gas
pipeline control system and 97.6% for the water storage tank control system. A review of
the misclassified attack case shows that the instances in NMRI attack class are also well
classified by the anomaly based IDS. The features in the training dataset related with
process control system measurement, measurement speed measurement derivative system
working mode and pump working status are used for anomaly based IDS to describe
NMRI attack profile. The IDS failed to detect the malicious packets that contain gas
pressure measurement or water level measurement in the valid normal measurement
range. During the NMRI attack, the network traffic may contain valid process control
system measurement, measurement speed measurement derivative system working mode
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and pump working status. These features are very relevant with features in the normal
network traffic class. So the IDS will misclassify these malicious packets as normal
packets and not trigger alarms. The false positive rate for the NMRI attacks was 0.8% for
the gas pipeline control system and 1.8% for the water storage tank control system. This
means the anomaly based IDS misclassify the normal traffic or CMRI attack class as
NMRI attack class. This is due to the reason that some CMRI attack process is very short
so that the presence of injected packets is low and the traffic pattern is similar with NMRI
attack class.
The anomaly based IDS detection rate for CMRI attacks was 97% for the gas
pipeline control system and 96.7% for the water storage tank control system. A review of
the misclassified attack case shows that the anomaly based IDS failed to detect some
CMRI packets. The features in the training dataset related with process control system
measurement, measurement speed measurement derivative system working mode and
pump working status are used for anomaly based IDS to describe CMRI attack profile.
During the CMRI attack, the network traffic may contain valid process control system
measurement, measurement speed measurement derivative system working mode and
pump working status. The measurement behavior of Calculated Sensor Measurement
Injection attack is closed to the normal traffic. These features are very relevant with
features in the normal network traffic class. So the IDS will misclassify these malicious
packets as normal packets and not trigger alarms. The false positive rate for the CMRI
attacks was 0.4% for the gas pipeline control system and 2.2% for the water storage tank
control system. This means the anomaly based IDS misclassify the normal traffic or
NMRI attack class as CMRI attack class. This is due to the reason that the measurement
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behavior pattern of Calculated Sensor Measurement Injection attack in the CMRI attack
process is similar with it in the normal traffic class.
The anomaly based IDS detection rate for MSCI attack was 94.5% for the gas
pipeline control system and 95.1% for the water storage tank control system. A review of
the misclassified attack case shows that the instances in MSCI attack class are also well
classified by the anomaly based IDS. The features in the training dataset related with
process control system setpoints, system working mode and pump working mode and
pump working status are used for anomaly based IDS to MSCI attack profile. The IDS
failed to detect the malicious packets that contain gas pressure setpoint or water level
setpoints in the valid range. During the MSCI attack, the network traffic may contain
valid combination of system setpoints, system working mode, pump working mode and
valid current system state. These features are very relevant with features in the normal
network traffic class. So the IDS will misclassify these malicious packets as normal
packets and not trigger alarms. The false positive rate for the MSCI attacks was 0.7% for
the gas pipeline control system and 2.1% for the water storage tank control system. This
means the anomaly based IDS misclassify the normal traffic as MSCI attack class. This is
due to the reason that the some combinations of system setpoints, system working mode,
pump working mode and valid current system state pattern in the MSCI attack process is
similar with it in the normal traffic class.
The anomaly based IDS detection rate for MPCI attacks was 94.5% for the gas
pipeline control system and 97.0% for the water storage tank control system. A review of
the misclassified attack case shows that the instances in MPCI attack class are well
classified by the anomaly based IDS. The features in the training dataset related with
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process control system setpoints and the controller parameters are used for anomaly
based IDS to MSCI attack profile. The IDS failed to detect the malicious packets that
contain gas pressure setpoint or water level setpoints and the controller parameters in the
valid range. During the MPCI attack, the network traffic may contain valid system
setpoints, controller parameters and valid current system state. These features are very
relevant with features in the normal network traffic class. So the IDS will misclassify
these malicious packets as normal packets and not trigger alarms. The false positive rate
for the MSCI attack was 0.4% for the gas pipeline control system and 0.9% for the water
storage tank control system. This means the anomaly based IDS misclassify the normal
traffic and MSCI as MPCI attack class. This is due to the reason that the some
combinations of system setpoints, controller parameters and valid current system state
pattern in the MPCI attack process is similar with it in the normal traffic class and MPCI
attack class.
The anomaly based IDS detection rate for MFCI attacks was 98.0% for the gas
pipeline control system and 98.0% for the water storage tank control system. A review of
the misclassified attack case shows that the instances in MFCI attack class are well
classified by the anomaly based IDS. The features in the training dataset related with
function code and sub function are used for anomaly based IDS to MFCI attack profile.
The IDS failed to detect the malicious packets that contain function code and sub
function in the valid range. During the MFCI attack, the network traffic may contain
valid function code and subfunction code. These features are very relevant with features
in the normal network traffic class. So the IDS will misclassify these malicious packets as
normal packets and not trigger alarms. The false positive rate for the MFCI attack was
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0.2% for the gas pipeline control system and 0.3% for the water storage tank control
system. This means the anomaly based IDS misclassify the normal traffic as MFCI attack
class. This is due to the reason that the normal traffic also contains very low presence
network packets that include same function code and subfunction code as in the MFCI
attack.
The anomaly based IDS detection rate for DOS attacks was 100% for the gas
pipeline control system and 100% for the water storage tank control system. A review of
the misclassified attack case shows that the performance of the IDS is very effective. The
false positive rate for the DOS attack was 0% for the gas pipeline control system and 0%
for the water storage tank control system. For the DOS attack detection, because
MODBUS’s maximum payload length limit is 256 bytes, the data logger will store packet
with maximum data length. Furthermore, the DOS floods meanness characters in traffic,
the MODBUS packet’s device address, function code and other information in the packet
doesn’t contain any useful information. There are many features in the dataset to describe
this abnormal behavior and classification algorithms can detect this type of attack with
high detection rate and low false positive.
Signature Based Intrusion Detection Result
This section provides a set of rules for a signature based intrusion detection
system. The rules described in the section are designed to detect the attacks described in
chapter 3. The rules are divided into two types; stand-alone and state-based rules. The set
of rules developed for this work are listed in Table11, stand-alone rules, and Table 12,
state based rules. Stand-alone rules parse a single MODBUS packet looking for a match
to a specific signature. If the signature is present in the parsed packet then the packet is
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classified as a match and an alert is issued. The stand-alone rules are implemented using
the Snort intrusion detection tool. The second type of rule is called state based. State
based rules require knowledge from previous MODBUS packets or from another source,
such as a process sensor. This extra knowledge may be related to the protocol state or the
state of the industrial control system being monitored. State based rules are processed
using a Snort pre-processor, hence forth referred to as the state based layer. Snort passes
the MODBUS payload in its entirety to the state based layer. The state based layer is
written in the C programming language. A set of C-language structures were developed
to store the state of the MODBUS protocol and a historical model of the state of the
industrial control system. The model of the state of the industrial control system is system
specific and requires expert knowledge to develop. The protocol state structure stores the
last received MODBUS packet. The historical state for the industrial control system holds
the command state and the process state. The command state is updated each time a
command is sent to a MODBUS server. For the gas pipeline the command state includes
items such as the on/off state of the pump, the open/closed state of the relief valve, the
system mode (manual or automatic), copies of set points, and other process specific
control information. The process state includes measurements related to the process. For
the gas pipeline the process state includes the last pressure reading and other system
measurements. Figure 14 shows the intrusion detection system architecture with separate
stand-alone and state based layers.
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Figure 14

Intrusion Detection System Architecture

Table 11lists IDS stand-alone IDS signatures and Table 12lists IDS signatures
which are state based and require a preprocessor.
Stand-alone rules #1-7 are used to detect reconnaissance attacks. MODBUS
address scans differ based upon the upper network layers. MODBUS/TCP address scans
search for IP addresses with MODBUS servers. MODBUS RTU and ASCII use a 1 byte
address field. MODBUS RTU and ASCII address scans search for address values which
provoke a response. MODBUS systems typically have a static set of member nodes each
with a fixed address. A white list of system address, whether IP addresses or 1 byte
addresses for MODBUS RTU and ASCII systems, can be developed. Stand-alone rules
#1 and #2 from Table 12 are used to detect packets which are addressed to a system not
in the RTU/ASCII or TCP address white lists respectively. A system specific white list
can be developed which includes all legal function codes a MODBUS server supports
and is allowed to receive. The function code white list can include all public MODBUS
function codes and any user defined function codes. However, many systems use only a
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subset of the public MODBUS function codes. As such the function code white list
should be limited to function codes used by the system being protected.
Stand-alone rule #3 alerts if a packet is received which includes a function code
not in the function code white list. Device ID scans are detected with stand-alone rule #4
which alerts if the function code is 0x11 or 0x2B. Since the allowed function code white
list will not include function codes 0x11 and 0x2B stand-alone rule #3 will also alert for
Device ID attacks. Care should be taken when implementing the device ID scan rule
since it effectively disallows systems and their operators from reading device IDs. If
reading the device ID is required the device ID scan rule should be disabled. Point scans
are detected using 3 rules.
First, stand-alone rules #5 and #6 use address white lists to detect read and write
transactions address disallowed memory regions. The two address white lists are a
writeable regions white list and a readable regions white list. These white lists include a
list of contiguous address regions which allow memory writes and reads respectively.
Rules #5 and #6 rules confirm the start address is within the white listed address region.
Rules #5 and #6 also compute the end address and confirm the end address is within the
white listed address region. The end address is computed by adding the read or write
length to the start address. The length value is available for all write and read function
codes. Rules #5 and #6 are implemented as separate stand-alone rules for each write and
read function code. They are described here as two rules to save space.
Stand-alone rule #7 is also used to detect point scans. Stand-alone rule #7 alerts if
an invalid address exception code is detected for a read or write function code. Properly
functioning MODBUS clients should not attempt to access an address which is not
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configured for reading on the target MODBUS server. As such any instance of the invalid
address exception code is evidence of a points scan. Stand-alone rule #7 is not adequate
to detect all points scans as it is possible certain memory regions are available on a
MODBUS server by default while not actually in use for the specific control system
being protected. The white lists associated with rules #5 and #6 should only include
address regions needed for the specific control system being protected. Stand-alone rule
#6 is also used to detect memory dump attacks. The read address white list should only
include read addresses reserved for access through the network and should not include
addresses used for internal program variables.
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Table 12
Number

MODBUS Stand-alone Intrusion Detection Rules
Name

Description
packet address address white list

2
3

RTU/ASCII Invalid
Address
TCP Invalid Address
Function Code Scan

4
5

Device ID Scan
Write Points Scan

6

Read Points Scan

7

Invalid Address

8

Invalid PID
Parameter

9

Gas Pipeline Invalid
Set Point
Oil Storage Tank
Invalid Set Point
Force Listen Only
Mode
Restart
Communication
Clear
Communications
Event Log
Change ASCII Input
Delimiter
Illegal Packet
Length
Invalid Response
Payload Content

1

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

Invalid Response
Payload Size

18

Invalid Error
Response

IP address IP address white list
packet function code  function
code white list
function code  {0x11, 0x2B}
(start address && end address)
write address region white list
(start address && end address)
read address region white list
Response & function code
{0x81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 8F, 90,
95, 96, A2, A3, A4} & exception
code = 02
gain != 115 | rate != 0 | reset != 0.2
| deadband != 0.5 | cycle time !=
1.0
H > 30 | L < 5 | HH > 40 | LL < 0
H > 80 | L < 20 | HH > 90 | LL <
10
function code = 0x08 &
sub-function = 0x0004
function code = 0x08 &
sub-function = 0x0001
function code = 0x08 &
sub-function = 0x0001&
data = 0xFF00
function code = 0x08 &
sub-function = 0x0003
Packet length > 255
Response & function code is 0x80
& each byte in payload is 0x00 or
0xFF
Response & function code is 0x80
& payload size != request payload
size in the command
Function code is 0x80 & exception
code !{0x1, 2, 3, 4 }
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Attack
Detected
1

Done

1
2

Done
Done

3
4

Done
Done

4, 5

Done

4

Done

21

Done

22

Done

22

Done

23

Done

24

Done

25

Done

26

Done

28

Done

6

Done

7

done

8

done

Table 13

MODBUS State Based Intrusion Detection Rules

Number

Name

Description
Response & function code = 03&
point address = 04 & value <0

14

Gas Pipeline
Pressure Negative
Response
Oil Storage Tank
Fill Level Negative
Response
Gas Pipeline
Measurement Outof-bounds
Oil Storage Tank
Measurement Outof-bounds
Gas Pipeline
Measurement Max
Rate of Change
Oil Storage Tank
Measurement Max
Rate of Change
Gas Pipeline
Measurement Min
Rate of Change
Oil Storage Tank
Measurement Min
Rate of Change
Gas Pipeline
Constant
Measurement
Gas Pipeline High
Pressure Critical
State
Gas Pipeline Low
Pressure Critical
State
Oil Storage Tank
High Liquid Level
Critical State
Oil Storage Tank
Low Liquid Level
Critical State
Invalid CRC Count

15

MODBUS Flood

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Attack
Detected
9

Done

Response & function code = 03 &
point address = 07 & value <0

9

Done

Response & function code = 03&
point address = b7 & (value < LL
OR value > HH)
Response & function code = 03 &
point address = e9 & (value < LL
OR value > HH)
Response & function code = 03 &
point address = b7 & slop e >
SLmax& slope != 0
Response & function code = 03&
point address = e9 & (M1-M0/T1T0) > SLmax & slope != 0
Response & function code = 03 &
point address = b7 & slope <
SLmin & slope != 0
Response & function code = 03&
point address = e9& slope < SLmin
& slope != 0
Response & function code = 03&
point address = b7& NC > T &
SystemMode = AUTO
pressure > HH & pump = ON &
relief valve = CLOSED

10

Done

10

Done

11, 12,
15, 16

Done

11, 12,
15, 16

Done

14, 17

Done

14, 17

Done

13

Done

18, 19,
20, 21,
22
18, 19,
20, 21,
22
18, 19,
20, 21,
22
18, 19,
20, 21,
22
27

Done

Done

28

Done

pressure < LL & (pump = OFF |
relief valve = OPEN)
liquid level > HH & pump = ON
liquid level < LL & pump = OFF
& system = ON
invalid CRC count > 5 in time
window 5
MODBUS Packet Count > 5 in
time window 5
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Done
Done
Done

State based rules #1 and #2 alert when sensor measurements are negative. These
rules are system specific. State based rule #1 alerts for a negative pressure measurement
for a gas pipeline system. State based rule #2 alerts for a negative water level
measurement for an oil storage system. In each case the rule must be programmed with
the function code used to read the measurement, the exact address of the point which
stores the measurement the measurement, and the width of the measurement in bytes.
There may be more than one function code used to poll the MODBUS server for the
measurement. In this case multiple instances of the rule can be created to cover each case.
Also, often MODBUS clients will read many points in a single read. In this case state
based rules #1 and #2 should be updated to check the correct set of bytes within the larger
read payload. These rules are state based because MODBUS read responses do not
include the address which was read from. As such, the state based layer stores the read
command details, including the read start address and quantity, and uses this information
within the rule.
State based rules #3 and #4 alert when process measurements are grossly out of
bounds. These rules are system specific. State based rule #3 alerts for an out-of-bounds
pressure measurement for a gas pipeline system. State based rule #4 alerts for an out-ofbounds water level measurement for an oil storage system. Both rules are programmed
with extreme limits for their respective process. These rules are configured as stand-alone
rules for this work implying that the extreme limits for the process are static or are
changed infrequently. For processes in which the extreme limits are variable the rules
could be converted to state based rules. In this case, a C structure would be used to store
the current extreme limits. The extreme limits could be updated by out of channel
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communication such as a secure socket opened between the IDS and the MODBUS client
which changes the extreme limits. The extreme limits may be set relative to the alarm
thresholds for the process measurement. In this case updates to the extreme limits could
be learned by sniffing the network traffic for commands which write to the alarm value
points. Monitoring network traffic to learn the alarm set points is less trustworthy than
learning of changes through an out of channel trusted link. Similar to state based rules #1
and #2 these rules are state based because MODBUS read responses do not include the
address which was read from.
State based rules #5 - #8 alert if the rate of change of a sensor measurement
exceeds or falls below specific maximum and minimums respectively. State based rules
#5 and #6 alert for high rates of change. A high rate of change may be a symptom of a
high slope, sporadic, or random measurement injection attacks. As successive
measurements are observed in network traffic the most recent measurement value and the
timestamp of the latest measurement are stored in the state based layer. As new
measurements are observed the rate of change of process measurements is calculated and
compared with a predefined maximum rate of change value. The rate of change is
calculated using equation 1, where M0 is the current measurement, M1 the previous
measurement, T1 is the time stamp of the current measurement, and T0 is the timestamp
of the previous measurement. Control systems tend to poll sensor measurements
periodically meaning T1-T0 will be approximately constant. For state based rules #5 and
#6 the term SLmax is the maximum rate of change allowed. In some systems the separate
maximum rates of change will be defined for the rising and falling measurement case. In
such cases two rules will be needed for each system. The maximum rate of change is
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system specific and must be defined in consultation with a system expert. This rule will
not detect all sporadic and random sensor measurement injections since some injected
measurements may be close enough to the previous value to not trigger the alert.
However, during an extended attack many measurements will trigger an al ert.
(5)
State based rules #7 and #8 alert for low rates of change. These rules detect low
slope measurement injection attacks. Similar to the maximum rate of change, the
minimum rate of change is system specific and system experts should be consulted when
setting this limit. In most systems no change in a measurement is acceptable. As such
rules #7 and #8 do not alert if the calculated slope is 0.
State based rule #9 alerts when a threshold of T consecutive packets is observed
with the same process measurement. In the description of state based rule #9 from Table
7, the variable NC is the count of consecutive packets without a measurement change.
Two laboratory scale process control systems were used to validate this work; a gas
pipeline and an oil storage tank. In both cases the process measurement continuously
changes when the system is placed in automatic mode (referred to as AUTO in Table 7).
The gas pipeline opens and closes a relief valve to control pressure in a pipeline. The oil
storage tank turns a pump on and off as the oil level drops and falls. The state based layer
calculates the count of consecutive packets without a process measurement change. The
state based layer also stores the current process system mode (AUTO or MANUAL).
State based rule #9 only detects constant level injection attacks in system state in which
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the process measurement is known to change. For systems where the measurement may
legally be constant these rules are not applicable.
A constant level injection attack which starts when the measurement is allowed to
be constant may be detected by the rate of change rules (state based rules #6 and #7) if
the injected measurement varies significantly from the measurement observed
immediately before the attack initiates. Subsequent packets during the attack will not
trigger alerts from the rate of change rules.
State based rules #6-#9 calculate the rate of change of a process measurement.
Equation 1 shows the method for calculating the rate of change. Equation 1 subtracts the
current measurement from the immediately prior measurement when calculating the rate
of change. For some systems it may be necessary to adjust this calculation to calculate the
rate of change over a smaller or larger time window depending upon the measured
variable and the frequency of measurements.
State based rules #10 - #13 monitor the physical process state and alert when the
process is in a critical state. Here a critical state is defined as a state of alarm in which the
control settings will drive the system further away from a normal system state and more
into the alarm state. For laboratory systems used for this work from critical states were
defined. First, state based rule #10 alarms if the gas pipeline pressure is above the high
level alarm set point (HH) and the pump is on and the relief valve is closed. Second, state
based rule #11 alarms if the gas pipeline pressure is below the low level alarm set point
(LL) and the pump is off or the relief valve is open. Third, state based rule #12 alarms if
the oil storage tank liquid level is above the alarm set point (HH) and the pump is on.
Fourth, state based rule #13 alarms if the oil storage tank liquid level is below the alarm
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set point (HH) and the pump is off and the system is on. Each of these states should never
occur for these physical processes. These IDS rules may alert due to an actual process
fault which leads the system to a critical state or may occur due to a cyber-attack driving
the process to a critical state via command injection attack. These state based rules will
alert for some but not all cases of the altered system control scheme, altered actuator state,
continually altered actuator state, altered proportional integral derivative parameter(s),
altered control set point command injection attacks. The rules will only alert if the
command injection drives the process to a critical state.
Stand-alone rule #8 alerts when a command to set PID parameters to an invalid
value is detected. The gas pipeline system uses a PID control to open and close the relief
valve to keep the pressure within the high (H) and low (L) set points. PID parameters are
set when a system is installed and PID parameters are rarely changed after initial setup.
Small changes in PID parameters can lead to drastic changes in system behavior. As such
rule #8 alerts for any change in any of the five PID parameters; gain, rate, reset, dead
band, and cycle time.
Stand-alone rules #9 and #10 provide limits process for set points. Both the gas
pipeline and oil storage systems used for this work include H, L, HH, and LL set points.
The H and L set points control the maximum and minimum pressure or liquid level for
the gas pipeline or oil storage tank respectively. These values are used by the program
running in the PLC connected to the physical processes to determine when to turn on/off
the pump for both systems and open close the relief value for the gas pipeline. The HH
and LL are alarm set points. For both systems process measurements outside the HH and
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LL bounds trigger an alarm. The limits used for stand-alone rules #9 and #10 are set with
system knowledge and represent reasonable values for the 4 set points.
The malicious function code injection attacks are detected with stand-alone rules
#11-#14.Each rule detects a specific function code and sub-function code combination.
Stand-alone rule #13 also matches a portion of the packet payload before alerting.
State based rules #14 detects the invalid cyclic redundancy code (CRC) flood
attack. MODBUS-RTU mode uses a 16-bit CRC. MODBUS-ASCII uses an 8-bit
longitudinal redundancy code (LRC).MODBUS-TCP frames do not include a CRC.
Rather MODBUS-TCP frames depend upon the TCP CRC for error checking. The
functions to generate the MODBUS-RTU and MODBUS ASCII CRC and LRC
respectively are available in the MODBUS over Serial Line Specification and
Implementation Guide [cxi]. Each packet is monitored in the state based layer. The
CRC/LRC is calculated within the state based layer and compared to the CRC/LRC with
the packet. A count of failed CRC/LRC over a time window is kept. If the number of
failed CRC/LRC exceeds a programmable threshold an alert is issued. For this work the
time window was 1seconds and the number of failed CRC required to trigger the rules
was 2.
Attack #28, MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming, is detected with two rules. First,
one method of implementing the MODBUS Slave Traffic Jamming attack is to transmit a
continuous stream of bytes from a slave radio. In this case the contents are irrelevant. To
detect this random stream of bytes, stand-alone rule #15 looks for packets of greater than
255 byte length. These are not legal MODBUS packets and should not appear on the line.
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In the case that the flood contents are made up of MODBUS packets a count of
MODBUS packets in a given time window is used to detect the flood.
Table 14

Signature based IDS Detection Results

Dataset
Recon

Gas Pipeline System
Detection Rate False Positive
98.7%
0.0%

Water Storage System
Detection Rate False Positive
98.7%
0.0%

naissance
NMRI
CMRI
MSCI
MPCI
MFCI
DOS
Normal

Table 15

95.4%
92.5%
89.8%
93.1%
100%
100%
99.5%

0.8%
0.5%
0.7%
0.4%
0.0%
0.0%
0.3%

94.2%
93.7%
90.1%
93.0%
100%
100%
99.5%

0.8%
0.6%
0.7%
0.6%
0.0%
0.0%
0.3%

Signature based IDS System Usage

Dataset
Recon

Gas Pipeline System
CPU Usage
Memory Usage
0.3%
1.5%

Water Storage System
CPU Usage
Memory Usage
0.3%
1.5%

naissance
NMRI
CMRI
MSCI
MPCI
MFCI
DOS
Normal

0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
1.3%
0.3%

1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%

0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
0.3%
1.3%
0.3%

1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5%

The signature based IDS detection rate for reconnaissance attacks was 98.7% for
the gas pipeline control system and 98.7% for the water storage tank control system. A
review of the misclassified attack case shows that the signature based IDS failed to detect
the malicious packets that contain valid device ID, function code and read/write memory
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address. During reconnaissance attack, attackers scan ranges of device address, function
code and memory. These ranges contain valid device address, function code and memory
address which have been defined in Snort rules. So the Snort will miss these malicious
packets and not trigger alarms. The false positive rate for the reconnaissance attacks was
0% for the gas pipeline control system and 0% for the water storage tank control system.
This means the signature based IDS does not misclassify the normal traffic or other types
of attack as reconnaissance attacks. The Snort rules for reconnaissance attacks mainly
focus on the network content such as device ID, function code and memory address. The
normal traffic packets and other attack packets will not satisfy these rules.
The signature based IDS detection rate for NMRI attacks was 95.4% for the gas
pipeline control system and 94.2% for the water storage tank control system. A review of
the misclassified attack case shows that the signature based IDS failed to detect malicious
packets that contain gas pressure measurement or water level measurement out of the
bound that defined by the Snort rules. During the NMRI attack, when the malicious
packet contains a false measurement that is very close to the next valid or true
measurement, the malicious packet will not violate the snort rules. The false positive rate
for the NMRI attacks was 0.8% for the gas pipeline control system and 0.8% for the
water storage tank control system. A review of false positive case shows that the IDS
misclassify some normal traffic packets and CMRI packets as NMRI packets. Sometimes
the valid measurements may fall in the invalid range of setpoints. These situations will
trigger false alarm. For example, the normal water level measurement may be in the
range of [HH, H] or [L, LL], which will lead to false positive due to the fact that these
ranges are out of the valid bound defined in the Snort rules.
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The signature based IDS detection rate for CMRI attacks was 92.5% for the gas
pipeline control system and 93.7% for the water storage tank control system. A review of
the misclassified attack case shows that the signature based IDS failed to detect malicious
packets that contain multi gas pressure measurements or water level measurements that
violate the valid system measurements states defined by the Snort rules. State based rules
#6-#9 calculate the rate of change of a process measurement. During CMRI attacks, when
attackers send simulated normal wave of measurements in the period, the IDS will miss
these malicious packets. The false positive rate for the CMRI attacks was 0.5% for the
gas pipeline control system and 0.7% for the water storage tank control system. A review
of false positive cases shows that the IDS misclassifies some normal traffic packets and
NMRI packets as CMRI packets. Sometimes the valid normal measurement wave may
trigger false alarms. For example, in the normal water level measurement wave, some of
packets may delay or loss, which will lead to the current speed of measurement changing
and will increase false positive rate.
The signature based IDS detection rate for MSCI attacks was 89.8% for the gas
pipeline control system and 90.1% for the water storage tank control system. A review of
the misclassified attack case shows that the signature based IDS failed to detect some
packets that contain malicious system state commands. The Snort rules defined ranges of
the system parameters. When these crafted parameters are in the Snort pre-defined range,
these malicious packets will pass. For example, when the crafted system measurement
setting point is in the valid range, it will not trigger alarms. The false positive rate for the
MSCI attacks was 0.7% for the gas pipeline control system and 0.7% for the water
storage tank control system. A review of false positive case shows that the IDS
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misclassifies some normal traffic packets as MSCI packets. Sometimes the valid normal
command may trigger false alarm. For example, in the normal water level measurement
wave, some of packets may be delayed or lost, which will lead to the current speed of
measurement significantly, changed and will lead to false positive.
The signature based IDS detection rate for MPCI attacks was 93.1% for the gas
pipeline control system and 93.0% for the water storage tank control system. A review of
the misclassified attack case shows that the signature based IDS failed to detect some
MPCI packets contain settpoint parameters or the controller parameters values that do not
violate the Snort rules. During the MPCI attack, when the malicious packet contains false
setpoint parameters values are closed or equal to true setpoint parameters or the controller
parameters, the malicious packet will not violate the snort rules. The false positive rate
for the MPCI attacks was 0.4% for the gas pipeline control system and 0.6% for the water
storage tank control system. A review of false positive cases shows that the IDS
misclassify some normal traffic packets as MPCI packets. Sometimes the valid normal
command may trigger false alarm. For example, sometimes the operator may set the
setpoints in the different range, these setpoints maybe in the Snort rules defined malicious
setpoint bound and will lead to false positive.
The signature based IDS detection rate for MFCI attacks was 100% for the gas
pipeline control system and 100% for the water storage tank control system. A review of
the detection result shows that the signature based IDS can detect this type attack at high
detection rate. The false positive rate for the MFCI attacks was 0% for the gas pipeline
control system and 0% for the water storage tank control system. The IDS only need to
monitor the function code and sub function code in the packet. If the invalid combination
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of function and sub function code occurs in the traffic, the IDS will trigger alert. In this
research, there are four types of attack defined in the MFCI attack, force listening mode,
restart communication, clean communication event log and change ASCII input delimiter.
The signature based IDS detection rate for DOS attacks was 100% for the gas
pipeline control system and 100% for the water storage tank control system. A review of
the detection result shows that the IDS is very effective when detecting DOS attack. The
false positive rate for the DOS attacks was 0% for the gas pipeline control system and 0%
for the water storage tank control system. For the DOS attack detection, because
MODBUS’s maximum payload length limit is 256 bytes, the data logger will store packet
with maximum data length. Furthermore, the DOS floods meanness characters in traffic,
the MODBUS packet’s device address, function code and other information in the packet
doesn’t contain any useful information. There are many features in dataset to describe
this abnormal behavior and classification algorithms can detect this type of attack with
high detection rate and low false positive.
This chapter discussed the implementation of a signature based intrusion detection
system and an anomaly based intrusion detection system. The signature based intrusion
detection system implementation introduces Snort rules used to detect attacks described
in Chapter 3. The Snort rules were evaluated in a laboratory setting to demonstrate
effectiveness by measuring accuracy. The rules were highly effective at detecting the
aforementioned attacks with low false positive rates. Signature based rules are most
effective for detecting known attacks. Anomaly based intrusion detection systems can be
used to detect unknown attacks. The anomaly based intrusion detection system
implementation used a decision tree algorithm to classify network traffic into the classes
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described in Chapter 4; normal, Naive Malicious Response Injection (NMRI), Complex
Malicious Response Injection (CMRI), Malicious State Command Injection (MSCI),
Malicious Parameter Command Injection (MPCI), Malicious Function Command
Injection (MFCI), Denial of Service (DOS), and Reconnaissance. Detection results
demonstrate that the features in the datasets and a set of predictive features described in
this chapter can provide sufficient information to provide a high detection rate with low
false positive rate. Because the signature based IDS excel at detecting known attacks
while anomaly based IDS excel at detecting unknown attacks using both styles of IDS is
recommended for SCADA systems.
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CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION

SCADA control system networks are vulnerable to attacks from external and
internal sources. Intrusion detection systems are needed to detect attacks on SCADA
networks and targeting SCADA system devices. In order to support intrusion detection
system in this area this dissertation provided four contributions.
First, four categories of cyber-attacks (reconnaissance, malicious command
injection, malicious response injection, and denial of service) were developed against two
laboratory scale serial communication based SCADA systems; gas pipeline system and
water storage tank system. In total twenty eight attacks against the serial SCADA systems
were implemented and validated. Reconnaissance and denial of service cyber-attacks
were also developed against chemical processing SCADA system which uses Ethernet
based communication. Three attacks were implemented and validated for the chemical
processing SCADA system. Second, this dissertation created a four network dataset
which include reconnaissance, malicious command injection, malicious response
injection, and denial of service classes of attacks and normal network traffic from
SCADA control system networks. The datasets can be used to benchmark SCADA
intrusion detection systems. Third, this dissertation implemented a signature based
intrusion detection system. The signature based intrusion detection system was evaluated
in a laboratory setting to demonstrate effectiveness by measuring accuracy. The signature
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based intrusion detection system rules were highly effective at detecting the
aforementioned attacks with low false positive rates. In total thirty signature based
intrusion detection system rules were created and validated. Fourth, an anomaly based
intrusion detection system for the SCADA network was developed. The anomaly based
intrusion detection system implementation used a decision tree algorithm to classify
network traffic into the normal class and the other attack classes described in
aforementioned datasets. The anomaly based IDS also had a high detection rate and low
false positive rate. A combined IDS which includes signature based IDS and anomaly
based IDS is recommended for SCADA networks. A combined IDS will benefit from
higher detection rates of signature based IDS while also benefitting from anomaly based
IDS ability to detect previous unknown attacks, aka. zero day vulnerabilities.
This research developed a minimal set of attacks (reconnaissance attack and
denial of service attack) against Ethernet based SCADA networks. Many more attacks
are possible such as malicious response injection attack and malicious command injection
attacks. The IDS research for this dissertation was based soley on the serial based
SCADA systems. Datasets for Ethernet based systems should be developed. Additionally,
signature based IDS rules should be written for Ethernet based SCADA systems. Finally,
anomaly based IDS should be developed for Ethernet based SCADA systems.
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